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ABSTRACT 
 
Faking on personality tests in selection contexts remains a concern for 
organizations and researchers.  Conditional reasoning tests (CRTs) are purported to 
predict construct-related outcomes and circumvent the faking issue by tapping into 
subconscious aspects of personality.  However, because CRTs are designed to look like 
inductive reasoning tests, the true purpose of the test may remain hidden from test takers 
resulting in this reduction in fakeability.  In order to investigate these claims, conditional 
reasoning tests for Extraversion and Agreeableness were developed and the validity and 
fakeability of these CRTs to traditional, self-report personality tests was compared.  
Additionally, the current study examines whether any reduction in the ability of test 
takers to fake the CRTs is due to the implicit nature of the test or the superficial 
appearance of conditional reasoning items as inductive reasoning items.  The results of 
this study show that participants were not able to fake the CRT if the purpose of the test 
at a personality measure remains hidden.  This finding persists when analyzing the 
effects on Extraversion and Agreeableness separately or when the true purpose of the 
test as a personality measure is revealed.  This is a positive outcome for proponents of 
conditional reasoning tests.  The results of this study indicate that it is the endorsement 
of justification mechanisms that prevent test takers from faking, supporting the social 
cognitive theory on which CRTs are based.  However, the CRTs do not predict relevant 
outcomes as well as traditional personality tests for Agreeableness and Extraversion.  
The implications of these findings and suggestions for future research are discussed.    
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Personality has been a promising and fruitful area of research in the past two 
decades, particularly with respect to the Big Five.  However, there is still much to learn, 
especially with respect to the limitations of trait views of personality and trait-based 
measures of personality as predictors of work-related outcomes in applied settings and 
the impact of faking on employment decisions (Arthur, Woehr, & Graziano, 2001).  This 
paper will describe a new method of measurement and how the application of this 
measurement method will alleviate concerns about faking on personality tests and add to 
the predictive validity of performance by tapping into subconscious portions of 
personality.  Another contribution of this study is that it answers the call of several 
researchers (Barrick & Mount, 2005; Hogan, 2005; Tett & Christiansen, 2007) to 
incorporate social cognitive theory into personality assessment.  To this end, I will begin 
by reviewing the concept of Big Five personality traits followed by a discussion of 
faking on personality tests.  I will also introduce a relatively new method of 
measurement, conditional reasoning tests (James, 1998; James et al., 2005), which I will 
use to assess two factors of Big Five personality: Agreeableness and Extraversion.  
Lastly, I will investigate whether conditional reasoning tests (CRTs) can mitigate faking 
on personality tests and whether the ability to fake responses on these tests are related to 
type of personality construct.  
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CHAPTER II 
PERSONALITY 
 
Most research on personality in the Industrial and Organizational (I/O) 
psychology and management literature, particularly with respect to personality testing, 
has focused on the Big Five perspective of personality, a trait theory of personality.  
Allport (1937) pioneered the term trait to describe the unique, internal characteristics 
that people possess.  The trait theory of personality is concerned with the structure and 
taxonomy of personality and sees personality traits as existing on a continuum from low 
to high (Campbell, 2008).  Trait theory allows psychologists to describe people with 
respect to different dimensions and to study the relationship between possession of these 
traits and specific outcomes.  The benefit of trait theory is that people can be compared 
based on their varying degrees of individual differences.  However, the major deficit of 
trait theory is that it does not explain the underlying cause of personality (Campbell, 
2008; McCrae & Costa, 1999).   
 The Big Five theory of personality describes personality along five main factors: 
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Extraversion, Neuroticism (within the normal range 
of personality), and Openness to Experience (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1992; McCrae & 
Costa, 1987).  Conscientiousness is defined in terms of being responsible, dependable, 
achievement-oriented, careful, and planful.  Agreeable people are courteous, flexible, 
good-natured, forgiving, softhearted, and tolerant.  Extraversion relates to a person’s 
sociability, gregariousness, assertiveness, talkativeness, and activeness.  Neuroticism 
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refers to traits such as anxious, depressed, angry, insecure, worried, or emotional.  
Frequently, Neuroticism is described in terms of its polar opposite, Emotional Stability.  
Finally, Openness to Experience is described with traits such as intellectual, imaginative, 
cultured, original, and artistic.  Part of the reason that the use of the Big Five to describe 
normal personality has been so popular among social scientists is that the taxonomy 
allows researchers and practitioners to quickly and easily describe people based on 
several broad traits and explore how these traits are related to several outcomes (Boyle, 
Matthews, & Saklofske, 2008).  The Big Five theory of personality has also been found 
to be cross-culturally valid leading to an interest in its use for multinational 
organizations (Church & Lonner, 1998). 
Based on meta-analytic research, several conclusions can be made regarding the 
validity of the Big Five as a predictor of work-related outcomes.  Tett, Jackson, and 
Rothstein (1991) found a corrected validity of .24 between personality (comprised of the 
Big Five, Type A, Locus of Control, and Miscellaneous) measures and job performance 
(corrected for predictor and criterion unreliability).  Numerous meta-analytic studies 
have investigated relationships between Big Five traits and various outcomes.  The 
following specific relationships come from Barrick, Mount, and Judge, (2001) and 
Hough and Furnham (2003); two of the more seminal works in workplace personality 
psychology.  Other meta analyses on the impact of personality on job performance have 
been conducted (e.g., Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; Judge, Rodell, Klinger, Simon, and 
Crawford, 2013), and validity coefficients are similar across these studies.  Thus, it is 
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clear that the Big Five personality traits are useful, in varying degrees, in the prediction 
of performance and a good construct to use for this new measurement method.  
Conscientiousness typically has the highest predictive validity.  Meta-analytic 
correlations are about .22 for Conscientiousness and overall job performance and are 
consistent across many occupational types.  Emotional Stability (normal range) is found 
to be a valid predictor of overall job performance across occupational types (ρ = .13) and 
may be particularly relevant for sales jobs (ρ =.27).  The validity of Extraversion for 
overall job performance ranges between .10 and .15, and validities for jobs that have 
social requirements range between .18 and .22.  Extraversion is also related to training 
performance (ρ = .26).  Agreeableness and Openness to Experience validity estimates are 
smaller; the meta-analytic correlation between Agreeableness and overall job 
performance ranges from .07 to .13 and the validity for Openness to Experience and 
overall performance is the lowest at .07.  Agreeableness and Openness have been found 
to be substantially related to specific outcome measures, however.  Agreeableness is 
significantly related to performance in teams (.33) and Openness is significantly related 
to training performance (.33).  A meta-analysis by Hurtz and Donovan (2000) found 
somewhat lower validities for the Big Five across multiple occupations and criteria.  The 
values these authors obtained ranged from .07 to .22 (corrected for range restriction, 
sampling, error, criterion unreliability, and predictor unreliability). 
Validities for the Big Five can be increased when predicting construct-congruent 
behaviors (Hogan & Holland, 2003).  When measuring specific, construct-congruent 
behaviors, validities for these predictors range from .25 to .34.  Also, combining all traits 
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to form a composite predictor can maximize validities particularly when predicting 
global outcomes (Barrick & Mount, 2005; Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007; 
Ones, Viswesvaran, & Dilchert, 2005).  Personality tests are also useful because they 
produce incremental validity over and above cognitive ability tests (Mount, Witt, & 
Barrick, 2000; McHenry, Hough, Toquam, Hanson, & Ashworth, 1990; Schmidt & 
Hunter, 1998).  Ones et al. (2007) report that the incremental validity of personality 
scales over and above cognitive ability in predicting job performance is between .07 and 
.16.  Unlike measures of cognitive ability, personality tests show little or no subgroup 
differences which means they are unlikely to result in adverse impact for protected 
groups (Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001).   
Besides performance, Big Five personality predicts a number of other work-
related outcomes and attitudes, such as leadership (Bono & Judge, 2004; Oh & Berry, 
2009; Van Iddekinge, Ferris, & Heffner, 2009), job satisfaction (Judge, Heller, & Mount, 
2002; van den Berg & Feij, 2003, organizational commitment (Erdheim, Wang, & 
Zickar, 2006), turnover (Salgado, 2002; Zimmerman, 2008), counterproductive work 
behaviors (Mount, Ilies, & Johnson, 2006) and training proficiency (Barrick & Mount, 
1991; Dean, Conte, & Blackenhorn, 2006).  
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CHAPTER III 
FAKING AND PERSONALITY TESTS 
 
Concerns about faking on personality tests have been around for almost as long 
as personality tests themselves (Zickar & Gibby, 2007).  Although some authors have 
downplayed the importance of faking in personality testing due to its minimal effect on 
criterion-related validity (e.g., Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, McCloy, 1990; Ones, 
Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996), some real concerns still remain.  Very few studies have 
actually used applicant samples, instead focusing on student and incumbent samples that 
may lack the same motivation to fake as job applicants (Hough et al., 1990; Viswesvaran 
& Ones, 1999).  In addition, faking has an effect on the rank ordering of candidates 
when personality tests are used in top-down selection processes, resulting in a 
disproportionate number of those who fake securing the top slots (Arthur et al., 2001; 
Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007).  There are also concerns that individual 
differences in faking may result in adverse impact during the selection process (Hough 
& Oswald, 2008; Jackson, Ashton, & Tomes, 1996; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999).  
Therefore, although the overall criterion-related validity of the personality test may not 
be affected, the effects on individuals and the organization can be profound.  In sum, 
psychologists should be concerned with faking on personality tests when used as part of 
the selection process, both from a scientific and practical standpoint.  The following 
sections discuss these assertions in detail and outline how conditional reasoning tests can 
address faking concerns. 
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Previous Research of the Effects of Faking 
Research has shown that people have the ability to fake on non-cognitive 
measures (Hough et al., 1990; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999).  Meta-analytic results of 
faking show that when instructed to do so, people can improve their scores on non-
cognitive tests by half a standard deviation on average (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999).  
Typical faking studies involve asking participants to complete the personality scale 
under an honest condition and a “fake good (or bad)” condition (Hough et al., 1990).   
 Although research shows that people can fake when instructed to do so, research 
is less consistent with respect to whether applicants actually fake in employment 
contexts (Griffith et al., 2007; Hough et al., 1990; Ones et al., 1996).  Rosse, Stecher, 
Miller, and Levin (1998) found that job applicants were more likely than job incumbents 
to fake on personality tests, with 29% of job applicants scoring two standard deviations 
above the job incumbent mean.  A meta-analysis by Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, 
Brannick, and Smith (2006) investigated the effects of personality test faking in actual 
applicant samples.  The authors found that applicants had larger standardized mean 
differences on four factors of the Big Five (d’s ranging from .11 to .45) than non-
applicants.  Agreeableness was the only factor that did not have significant mean 
differences.  However, after examining job type as a moderator, the authors concluded 
that there were mean differences in faking on Extraversion and Agreeableness for those 
applying to sales versus non-sales jobs.  Applicants applying for sales jobs were more 
likely to increase their Extraversion scores and to decrease their Agreeableness scores, 
presumably to match the characteristics that applicants thought were important for the 
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job for which they were applying.  Therefore, although Agreeableness mean differences 
were not found to differ between applicants and non-applicants, there is still an 
important mean difference for Agreeableness for certain jobs. 
Griffith et al. (2007) investigated whether applicants fake in selection contexts.  
Applicants completed a personality test as part of the selection process for a temporary 
employment agency.  One month later, the applicants were asked to complete the 
personality measure two more times, one under an honest condition where applicants 
were assured that their responses would never be seen by employers and one under a 
“fake good” condition where applicants were asked to respond in a way that would make 
them most desirable to a potential employer.  The results of study showed mean 
differences between the three response instructions such that the honest condition 
produced the lowest mean values, the applicant condition produced higher mean values, 
and the fake good condition produced the highest mean values.  In addition, chi-square 
tests revealed that a significant number of applicants faked their responses on the test 
(between 22% and 49% depending on the rigidity of the definition used to categorize 
people as fakers).  Griffith et al. (2007) also investigated the effect of applicant faking on 
their rank order.  Under selection ratios of 50%, 20%, and 10%, the percentage of 
applicants who would not have been hired had their honest conditions been used would 
have been 31%, 33%, and 66%, respectively.  In sum, faking among applicants can have 
a detrimental effect on the applicants not selected into organizations.  Another unique 
contribution of this paper is that it investigates an actual applicant group as opposed to 
student or incumbent groups.  It is important to study faking in applicant samples 
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because applicants have a high motivation to fake and this motivation may be difficult to 
reproduce in student or incumbent samples.   
Outcomes of Faking on Test Validity 
Research on the effect of faking on validity has also been mixed (Griffith, 1998; 
Ones et al., 1996; Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001).  An oft-cited 
study by Ones et al. (1996) found that partialling out social desirability from the 
personality and performance relationship resulted in no effect on criterion-related 
validity.  The authors asserted that faking on personality tests posed no threat to the use 
of personality tests in employment contexts.  However, Ellingson, Sackett, and Hough 
(1999) found that similar to the effects of faking on criterion-related validity, faking 
does negatively impact the construct validity for personality tests in laboratory faking 
studies, but not in real-world settings. 
Monte Carlo studies have found that faking can dramatically alter the rank 
ordering of applicants and can decrease mean validities (Zickar & Drasgow, 1996).  
Other studies also reported that faking is problematic for hiring decisions, particularly 
when selection ratios are low (Rosse et al., 1998) and that criterion-related validity 
between personality scores and job performance were lower for those who scored in the 
upper range of the personality test values and was negative for top scorers (Haaland & 
Christiansen, 2002).   
Individual Differences in Faking 
Jackson et al. (1996) argue that faking is a function of personal, situational, and 
motivational factors and the ability to fake is an individual difference in and of itself.  
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This leads to a disparity between people who fake and those who do not, which may 
result in negative selection outcomes for those who do not fake, particularly in cases 
where the number of applicants is greater than the number of available positions and 
when top-down selection is used (as is true in many selection contexts).    
Faking on personality tests contains three components: whether a test taker has 
the ability to fake, whether they have the opportunity to fake, and whether they have the 
motivation to fake (Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012).  Each of these 
components can be affected by individual differences, which may result in differential 
prediction for protected groups (Snell et al., 1999).  Research has shown substantial 
subgroup differences in scores on cognitive ability tests based on race (Hough et al., 
2001).  It has been argued that cognitive ability may be related to test taking strategy, 
which may influence the ability to fake on noncognitive tests (Snell et al., 1999).  If this 
is the case then differences in faking may lead to adverse impact for protected groups.  
Research has found differences for sex and age with respect to the motivation to fake 
(Graham, Monday, O’Brien, & Steffen, 1994; Newstead, Franklyn-Stokes, & Armstead, 
1996).  While personality tests themselves have been purported to result in little to no 
adverse impact (Hough et al., 2001; Ployhart & Holtz, 2008), differential prediction may 
occur in selection contexts due to group differences in the ability and the motivation to 
fake.  This could result in adverse impact for protected groups, particularly if top-down 
selection procedures are used.  
 In sum, previous research has shown that faking can pose a threat to the validity 
and adverse impact of personality tests when they are used in selection contexts.  These 
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threats are cause for concern for organizations desiring to use personality assessments as 
part of their selection procedure.  A number of strategies have been advanced as ways to 
ameliorate the negative outcomes of faking.  These strategies are discussed further in 
this chapter.   
Social Desirability/Impression Management/Self-Deception  
Meehl and Hathaway (1946) first introduced the concepts of conscious and 
unconscious faking, known as faking and self-deception, respectively.  Response 
distortions can occur when one makes a motivated effort to distort responses (faking) 
whereas self-deception involves people who believe they are honestly responding even 
though their responses do not match objective personality (Ones et al., 1996; Zickar & 
Gibby, 2007).  Another term found in the literature is social desirability.  Paulhus (2002) 
describes socially desirable responding as the tendency to give overly positive self-
descriptions.  It is generally believed that socially desirable responding consists of two 
facets: self-deception and impression management (synonymous with faking). 
Reducing the Impact of Faking 
A number of solutions have been suggested as means to curtail the 
preponderance of faking or to reduce the impact of faking on personality tests (Arthur & 
Glaze, 2011; Hough, 1998).  These methods fall into two general categories: methods 
used to detect faking on personality tests and methods used to deter test takers from 
faking (Arthur & Glaze, 2011; Glaze, 2012).  Techniques such as score comparison and 
verification testing, use of lie scales, response patterns, and response latencies comprise 
the detection category.  The deterrence category involves techniques such as forced-
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choice responding, empirical keying, verification and threats, elaboration, profile 
matching, and nonlinear modeling.  These techniques are briefly described below.  For a 
summary of these strategies, see Table 1. 
Detection- Lie scales.  One method to detect faking involves developing lie 
scales that are designed to tap into individual differences in the proclivity to fake.  Lie 
scales typically ask test takers to agree or disagree with statements that elicit socially 
desirable responding (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Hough, 1998).  Then, by comparing 
the responses of individuals under faking and honest conditions, faking can be detected.  
These scales can be interlaced within the personality measure or administered separately. 
The argument could be made that an effective way to control for the negative 
effects of social desirability is to correct applicant test scores before making hiring 
decisions.  Lie scales have been used to correct personality test scores (Meehl & 
Hathaway, 1946).  Assuming these corrections could be applied in a fair and consistent 
manner, the need for new personality tests to circumvent the faking issue would be 
unnecessary.  Considerable research has been conducted on the use of social desirability 
scales to correct for faking (Burns & Christiansen, 2006; Goffin & Christiansen, 2003).  
Although many practitioners believe that correcting for social desirability can improve 
the validity of personality tests (Burns & Christiansen, 2006), research has shown that 
these corrections only have a negligible effect on the criterion-related validity, implying 
that their use is inconsequential (at least when rank order selection is not used; Ones et 
al., 1996).  Moreover, applying social desirability corrections for faking has been found 
to reduce the construct validity of personality scales (Nicholson & Hogan, 1990).  Social 
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desirability has been found to be related to real differences in Emotional Stability (ρ = 
.37 for self-ratings of personality and .18 for other’s ratings) and Conscientiousness (ρ = 
.20 for self, .13 for other), so partialling out the effects of social desirability results in a 
reduction of the true variance in personality scores (Ones et al., 1996).  In addition, 
social desirability, as measured by traditional social desirability tests, may not fully 
capture the behavior exhibited by job candidates in the real world (Kluger & Collela, 
1993; Ones et al., 1996; Paulhus, 1984).  Applicants may be motivated to respond to 
personality tests in ways that are consistent with the job, but are not socially desirable.  
For instance, applicants for sales jobs would not want to seem overly agreeable, lest they 
be seen as pushovers. 
Detection- Response patterns.  Test administrators can also examine the pattern 
of responses supplied by test takers to identify possible faking.  Early methods involved 
identifying test respondents who selected answers in the extremes of the scale more 
frequently than normal (e.g., Humm & Wadsworth, 1934).  Many current, commercially-
available personality scales include response styles in reports such as the extent to which 
test takers agree (acquiescence) or disagree (nay-saying) with test statements regardless 
of content (e.g., Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey; Guilford, Zimmerman, & 
Guilford, 1976; NEO-PI-R; Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc., 2000).  While 
response pattern analysis is able to identify erratic or biased responding, it is unclear 
how test administrators should utilize this information.  Similar to lie scales, legal and 
ethical challenges emerge if test taker scores are corrected or disqualified during the 
application process. 
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  Detection- Response latencies.  Based on findings that demonstrate that 
individuals take longer to respond than people who are responding honestly (Holden, 
1998; Vasilopoulos, Reilly, & Leaman, 2000), it has been posited that a way to detect 
faking is by measuring the amount of time between the presentation of the item and the 
response to the item (response latency) .  Research on the effectiveness of this method 
for detection of faking has been mixed, however.  Although McDaniel (1990) found 
slower responding for test takers faking an integrity test compared to those who 
responding honestly, other research  indicate no difference in the response latencies of 
test takers under honest and faking conditions (Kluger, Reilly, & Russell, 1991; 
McManus, 1990,Vasilopoulos, et al., 2000).  Inconsistencies in results may be due to 
item characteristics and individual differences impact response latencies (Holden, 
Fekken, & Cotton, 1991).  Another factor involving the use of response latencies for 
detection is the requirement of computer-administered tests.  Although the use of 
technology-enabled assessment has become increasingly commonplace (Tippins et al., 
2006), certain environmental obstacles (e.g., onsite testing at an oil refinery) may 
prohibit its use. 
Summary of detection methods.  Although a number of strategies have been 
suggested as a means to detect faking, they all raise the question of what to do when 
fakers are identified.  As mentioned in the section on lie scales, the test scores of those 
identified as fakers can be statistically corrected.  Alternatively, those identified as 
fakers can be removed from the applicant pool altogether.  Removing applicants from 
the selection process has not been found to affect criterion-related validities (Hough, 
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1998).  However, other researchers have called into question the efficacy of such 
statistical control methods (Ellingson et al., 1999; Goffin & Christiansen, 2003; Ones et 
al., 1996).  Not to mention, the practical impact of corrections or eliminations may have 
a pronounced effect on adverse impact or perceived test fairness.   
Empirical keying.  In addition to detecting individuals who fake on personality 
tests, other precautions can be taken to reduce faking on tests.  For example, empirical 
keying, a method by which items or item responses are scored according to their 
relationship with a criterion measure is sometimes utilized to mask responses that are 
socially desirable (Hogan, 1994).  This technique is most frequently used with biodata 
measures but has also been used for situational judgment tests (Bergman, Drasgow, 
Donovan, Henning, & Juraska, 2006; Mumford & Owens, 1987).  Research on this 
method suggests that, although it may reduce the impact of faking, it does not eliminate 
it (Kluger et al., 1991). 
Warnings, verifications, and threats.  Other methods to control faking on 
personality tests involve creating testing conditions that foster honest responding.  Test 
administrators can convince test takers that it is not in their best interest to distort 
answers, warn against purposefully distorting answers, and threaten test takers with 
negative consequences of distortion (Hough et al. 1990; Ones et al., 1996).  Early 
attempts to control faking often directly asked applicants to respond honestly.  Tests 
themselves can contain warnings that answers can be verified or test takers can be 
warned if responses are inconsistent.  Research has been mixed with respect to the 
usefulness of these methods (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Meehl & Hathaway, 1946).  For 
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the response verification technique, stronger correlations were found between 
personality and cognitive ability and response latencies were more exaggerated when 
warnings were present suggesting that such warnings increase the complexity of the tests 
(Vasilopoulos, Cucina, & McElreath, 2005). 
Elaboration may also help deter faking by asking test takers to expand on their 
responses on some or all items.  It is posited that test takers who are contemplating 
faking on a test item will be less likely to do so if they know they must also fabricate an 
elaboration (Arthur & Glaze, 2011).  However, this strategy may produce unintended 
consequences when test takers are required to elaborate only when certain response 
options are endorsed; test takers may refrain from selecting options that require greater 
effort.  Schmitt et al. (2003) found that although elaboration does not affect correlations 
between social desirability and responses, test scores are much lower under elaboration 
conditions than nonelaboration conditions.   
Profile matching and nonlinear modeling.  Profile matching is an additional 
way to mitigate the negative impact of faking.  Profile matching involves assessing the 
match (or mismatch) between test taker personality profiles.  These profiles consist of 
the compilation of scores for multiple personality constructs.  Profile matching can be 
used within a selection context by comparing an applicant profile to the profile of an 
“ideal” candidate (Arthur & Glaze, 2011).  Profile matching involves the combination of 
two profiles into a single score that represents their overall congruence (Edwards, 1993; 
also known as similarity, fit, or agreement).  Underlying profile matching is 
acknowledgement that the specified relationships in profiles are nonlinear (Arthur & 
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Glaze, 2011).  Research has begun to support the notion that at least some personality 
constructs have a nonlinear relationship to performance (Arthur et al., 2001; Waller, 
Tellegen, McDonald, & Lykken, 1996). 
Similarity in profiles can be indicated through correlations between profiles or 
the sum of differences in profiles.  Research on the efficacy of profile matching has been 
sparse (Glaze, 2012).  However, the typical way that profile matching is utilized in the 
literature results in several drawbacks (Edwards, 1993).  Profile matching combines 
several components into a single score, making interpretation conceptually ambiguous; it 
is unknown which element of the profile contributes to the differences.  Sum of 
differences indices can overlook important information concerning the absolute level 
(i.e., different scores can be of equal distance from the comparison score yet differ in 
their placement on the scale) and, often, the directionality (i.e., different scores can be of 
equal distance from the comparison score yet positive or negative in comparison) of the 
difference.  However, this drawback can be avoided by using different decision rules.  
Correlational indices can omit information about the magnitude of the difference 
between profiles.   
Several best practice guidelines have been advanced with profile matching.  
Stating the aims of the project in specific, rather than general terms and focusing on 
specific dimensions as opposed to overall profiles may alleviate concerns related to 
ignoring information.  Multi-item, as opposed to single-item measures should be used 
and profiles should be comprised of normative instead of ipsative measures.  Lastly, 
congruence should be analyzed using polynomial regression in order to avoid 
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amalgamating measures into a single score.  However, these guidelines still exhibit 
limitations (Edwards, 1993; Edwards & Parry, 1993).  It may be impractical or 
undesirable to separate measures within profiles and reliabilities may be low if the 
original measures are specific due to the increase in specific-item variance above 
common-item variance.  In reference to the polynomial regression recommendation, 
residual degrees of freedom will be reduced as the number of profile components 
increases.  Also, because of the exploratory nature of the process, the methodology used 
in polynomial regression may result in capitalization on chance and arbitrarily ordered 
variables in the equation.  The large number of significance tests required for polynomial 
regression is likely to inflate Type I error rates and any curvilinear or interaction terms 
may be difficult to interpret.  
Test methodologies.  A number of testing methodologies have been advanced as 
resistant to faking.  Biodata, situational judgment tests, and structured interviews have 
been advanced as ways to reduce faking compared to traditional Likert-type personality 
tests (Cascio, 1975; McCarthy, Van Iddekinge, & Campion, 2010; Weekley & Ployhart, 
2006).  However, the usefulness of these testing methodologies as a way to reduce 
faking has been called into question (Hooper, Cullen, & Sackett, 2008; Levashina & 
Campion, 2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Ramsay, Schmitt, Oswald, Kim & Gillespie, 
2006).   
Forced-choice formatting for personality tests has been advocated as a way to 
reduce faking by asking test takers to choose between options that are equally socially 
desirable (Edwards, 1957).  Forced-choice tests suffer from several drawbacks (Zickar & 
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Gibby, 2007).  First, forced-choice options are difficult to create because test writers 
must develop options with equal valence.  Also, respondents often dislike making the 
difficult choices necessary in forced-choice formats.  This could be especially 
problematic for the face validity of forced-choice formats.  There are three potential 
outcomes of lower face validity for organizations (Chan, Schmitt, DeShon, Clause, & 
Delbridge, 1997; Smither, Reilly, Millsap, Pearlman, & Stoffey, 1993).  Lower face 
validity may impact the organizational attractiveness of an organization leading to 
changes in applicants’ likelihood of seeking or accepting job offers, particularly when 
the job market is favorable to employees.  Lower face validity may also be related to 
increased likelihood of litigation or decrease in the success of the legal defense of the 
selection procedure.  Face validity can also have an impact on the validity and utility of a 
selection procedure due to its effect on test-taking motivation and loss of qualified 
applicants.  Also, forced-choice formats result in ipsative data, making comparisons 
between individuals less meaningful (Meade, 2004).  Lastly, research indicates that 
people are able to fake forced-choice tests (Waters, 1965).   
In sum, there have been many attempts to reduce faking and/or its effect in 
testing.  However, many of these have had little success at best and are often costly to 
organizations or test takers.  Therefore, it is necessary to explore alternative strategies 
that attempt to make faking an irrelevant issue altogether.  Implicit tests that are 
purported to measure personality at the subconscious level bypass the ability of test 
takers to fake.  Conditional reasoning tests are argued to be the implicit test that may be 
of great benefit to organizations.  
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Table 1 
Summary of Strategies Identified to Prevent or Reduce the Negative Impact of Faking 
 
(table continued) 
 
 
Strategy Description Effectiveness 
Lie Scales  Measures designed to tap into 
proclivities to fake  
 Can be used to detect faking 
or correct personality test 
scores 
 Have the ability to detect faking 
 Little improvements in criterion-related validity when used 
for corrections 
 Reduces construct validity when used for corrections 
 May result in legal/ethical problems if scores are corrected 
Response 
Patterns 
 Investigation of a test taker’s 
pattern of responses to detect 
faking 
 Have the ability to detect faking 
 Little guidance given on how to use to correct for faking 
 May result in legal/ethical problems if scores are corrected 
Response 
Latencies 
 Measurement of the amount 
of time it takes a test taker to 
respond to an item 
 Argued that those who fake 
are likely to take longer to 
respond to items 
 Research mixed with respect to ability to detect faking 
 Requires use of computer-administered tests in order to 
measure 
 May result in legal/ethical problems if scores are corrected 
Empirical 
Keying 
 Utilizing items or item 
responses on a test that have 
particular relationships with 
various criteria to mask social 
desirability 
 Reduces, but fails to eliminate faking 
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Table 1 Continued 
 
Strategy Description Effectiveness 
Warnings, 
Verifications, 
and Threats 
 Cautioning test takers that 
faking may be detected 
negative consequences may 
occur if faked 
 Tries to convince test takers 
to respond honestly 
 Research mixed 
 May increase complexity of test 
 May reduce test scores when certain methods are used 
Profile 
Matching and 
Nonlinear 
Modeling 
 Comparing scores on sets of 
personality constructs 
between individuals (e.g., 
applicant and ideal employee) 
to determine the amount of 
congruence between the two 
 Research is sparse on profile matching 
 Combination of scores may result in conceptually 
ambiguous information 
 Methods exist to reduce drawbacks of profile matching but 
these methods may have negative statistical and practical 
implications 
Test 
Methodologies 
for Deterrence 
 Creating test or item response 
formats that discourage faking 
 Test methodologies such as biodata, situational judgment 
tests, and structured interviews as well as forced-choice 
formats have been found to be susceptible to faking 
 Often difficult to develop 
 Forced-choice formats often result in negative applicant 
reactions 
 Forced-choice formats only result in ipsative data 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONDITIONAL REASONING TESTS AND THE SOCIAL COGNITIVE 
THEORY OF PERSONALITY 
 
Implicit personality tests attempt to circumvent the faking issue by measuring 
implicit personality.  Implicit personality occurs outside of a person’s awareness 
(Epstein, 1994; Mierke & Klauer, 2003; Schmukle & Egloff, 2005; Wilson, Lindsley & 
Schooler, 2000).  Because this component of personality occurs outside a person’s 
awareness, neither accurate self-insight nor deliberate misrepresentation should affect an 
individual’s scores on implicit tests of personality (Robinson & Neighbors, 2006).  
There are a number of implicit tests that have been designed to tap into subconscious 
constructs (e.g., the Implicit Association Test, the Thematic Apperception Test, and 
Rorschach).  One such test is the conditional reasoning test.   
Conditional reasoning tests (CRTs) are a relatively recent approach of implicitly 
measuring personality traits (James, 1998; James et al., 2005; LeBreton, Barksdale, 
Robin, & James, 2007).  CRTs are based upon “the judgments, explanations, and 
theories people have about the causes and effects of their own behavior and the behavior 
of others in social environments” (James & Mazerolle, 2003, pp. 3-4).  Unlike traditional 
self-report personality tests, which typically derive from the trait perspective of 
personality, CRTs utilize social cognitive theory of personality to identify people with 
particular personality traits.  
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Social Cognitive Theory of Personality  
Social cognitive theory of personality seeks to understand the person as a whole 
and both the stable and dynamic nature of personality in different contexts.  Cervone, 
Shadel, and Jencius (2001) emphasize that a person’s experiences and personality 
characteristics shape their interpretation of the world and this in turn affects their 
behaviors.  One type of social cognitive theory of personality is the cognitive-affective 
processing system theory (CAPS) which states that things like a person’s abilities, 
attitudes, and emotions interact with the environment to predict stable patterns of 
behavior (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002).  For 
example, a person who is talkative and outgoing when in the presence of good friends 
may be less talkative and outgoing when meeting people for the first time.  Following 
this line of reasoning, even relatively stable cognitions and behaviors are influenced by 
the situation.  
Rationalizations are another part of social cognitive theory.  Mischel (1969) 
argues that people want to see continuity between the way they think they are and the 
way they actually behave.  There is a need to maintain the whole even when engaging in 
seemingly separate behaviors.  When individuals engage in behaviors that do not match 
their attitudes or values, they are likely to change their cognitions instead of their 
behavior because they are unable to change past behavior (Festinger, 1957; Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959).  By engaging in rationalizations, people can provide explanations for 
their behaviors so that their behaviors seem to match with the way they think. 
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 One’s thinking, emotions, and actions are derived from one’s subjective 
interpretation of the world, the self, and others (Cervone, 2008).  These cognitions, in 
turn, affect the behavior of people.  James and colleagues argue that people have a need 
to view their behaviors as rational as opposed to irrational and they frame and analyze 
the world differently in order to match the world with these views (James, 1998; James 
& Mazerolle, 2003; LeBreton et al., 2007).  In other words, people want to believe that 
their behaviors are logical and sensible, so they rationalize behaviors in a manner 
consistent with their worldview.  It is believed that these rationalizations are based on 
people’s personalities (James & LeBreton, 2012).  The purpose of rationalizations is to 
convince oneself and others that their actions and cognitions are in unison (Allport, 
1937).  No one wants to admit that they may be irrational (or in some cases even 
unethical), so they justify their behaviors to not only convince others that their behaviors 
are just, but to ease the dissonance between their thoughts and their actions (Festinger, 
1957).  It is a self-protective process, and because people receive rewards (e.g., social 
approval, attenuation of distress) from engaging in these cognitive ploys, it reinforces 
the behavior and leads naturally to the tendency to engage in them in the future.   
Comparison of Trait and Social Cognitive Theories of Personality  
Social cognitive theory of personality brings an added benefit to the 
measurement of traits in terms of understanding the underlying mechanisms in shaping 
behavior.  Self-reported traits are often used to predict the behaviors they are intended to 
describe, resulting in tautology (Cervone & Shoda, 1999).  Social cognitive theorists 
argue that it is important to understand the theoretical underpinnings of personality in 
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order to fully comprehend the relationships of personality to various outcomes (Ozer & 
Reise, 1994).  These underlying mechanisms allow researchers to have a better 
understanding of the person as a whole.  Allport and Allport (1921) argue that traits 
represent a superficial understanding of a person’s personality.  Although outward 
expressions of personality traits are important, they are but one aspect of a person’s 
personality.  A deeper, less apparent component of personality also exists, relating to the 
underlying causes of personality and greatly affects the way personality manifests itself 
in the individual (Allport & Allport, 1921).  For instance, while it is true that a person 
who finishes their work on time would be described as having high Conscientiousness, 
they may engage in this behavior for a variety of reasons including good habits learned 
from parents, compensation for bad habits, or a need to be submissive to the demands of 
others.  Allport and Allport (1921) argue that these underlying causes determine the 
intensity of the personality trait being exhibited and this component is overlooked when 
simply examining the traits of individuals.  Social cognitive theory addresses these 
concerns by incorporating the influence of the environment and the individual’s 
perception of the situation.  This discussion is not intended to devalue the importance of 
trait theory in psychology.  As mentioned above, trait-based measures of personality are 
valid, reliable, and can be used to predict a wide variety of trait-relevant behaviors.  
Instead, social cognitive theory is seen as an explanatory mechanism of trait theory; it 
describes how traits come to exist.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONDITIONAL REASONING TESTS IN PRACTICE 
 
Conditional reasoning tests (CRTs) incorporate social cognitive theory of 
personality into personality measurement by tapping into the rationalizations that people 
use to make sense of their own behavior.  This method of measurement allows 
researchers to obtain a more comprehensive view of the individual rather than trait-based 
tests alone.  The rationalizations people give for their behaviors represent unconscious 
biases in the interpretation of events and are known in the CRT literature as justification 
mechanisms (JMs).  JMs are implicit; people are unaware that their own biases influence 
their reasoning (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2003).  CRTs also capture contextual 
components of personality.  CRTs are designed to elicit responses based on the 
justification mechanisms people give to rationalize their behaviors.  This is a large part 
of the social cognitive basis of personality, leading to a different measurement of 
personality than trait-based measures.   
People try to enhance the rational appeal of their behaviors by framing the 
situation in ways consistent with their personality; that is, they engage in implicit 
reasoning biases.  For example, people with different personalities use different 
adjectives to describe a given situation; they make different attributions regarding their 
behavior and the behavior of others and assign different probabilities to particular 
outcomes (James & Mazerolle, 2003).  These are all JMs for a particular personality 
trait.  With respect to aggression, James (1998) argues that someone who is aggressive 
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tends to view their aggressive behaviors as justified for several reasons (e.g., they see 
themselves as victims of oppression by a powerful other, they have a tendency to see the 
actions of others as hostile, and they prefer retaliation over reconciliation).  
The process by which people invoke a particular JM due to their personalities is 
termed conditional reasoning.  Conditional reasoning tests capitalize on this process by 
assuming that people will differentially respond to personality test questions based on 
their personality trait standings because they will interpret the same event differently due 
to the influence of their justification mechanisms.  For example, conscientious people 
perceive following rules and obeying others as positive because it is the responsible 
thing to do in a social world.  Those who are low in Conscientiousness perceive 
following rules and obeying others as negative because these are seen as an impediment 
to their autonomy.  In the previous example, the justification mechanism is the extent to 
which following rules is seen as an impediment to an individual’s autonomy.  CRTs are 
designed to tap into these differences in JMs.  
In general, CRTs are constructed so that they appear to be an inductive reasoning 
test.  Test takers are instructed to read a brief paragraph and then choose the most logical 
option based on the information given.  Two options are structured around the JMs 
associated with opposite poles of the personality trait.  The other options are nonsensical 
given the information in the stem and are used primarily to make the measure face valid.  
Test takers endorse the option that is consistent with their own conditional reasoning 
(see LeBreton et al., 2007 for an example Aggression CRT item).  
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CRTs are scored such that a test taker receives one point for selecting a trait-
congruent response and loses one point for selecting the trait-incongruent option.  The 
test taker receives no points for selecting illogical options.  Thus, the range of scores for 
a particular item can range from -1 to +1.  Scores are then summed across items to 
determine a total scale score, with higher scores indicating higher levels of the trait.   
The purpose of the illogical items is to reinforce the appearance of an inductive 
reasoning problem.  However, the question has been raised about the impact of these 
illogical options on CRTs.  Although little data has been published on the frequency of 
people selecting illogical responses, James et al. (2005, p. 77) report most respondents 
choose responses related to JMs.  The development of illogical options is given careful 
consideration in the test development process to reduce the superfluous impact of these 
options.  LeBreton et al. (2007) emphasize that CRT distractor options are created to be 
clearly illogical and the CRT-A was reviewed by a logician to ensure that items were 
logically sound.  Because of these precautions, less than 5% of respondents chose 
illogical items over the course of thousands of test administrations (James, 2005; 
LeBreton et al., 2007).  The current study will report the number of illogical responses 
chosen by participants in order to more fully investigate this issue. 
Validity of Conditional Reasoning Tests 
James et al. (2005) found validity estimates for the Aggression CRT (CRT-A) 
ranging from .32 to .64 with an average validity coefficient of .44 (corrected for 
dichotomization of criteria).  These estimates are based on the criteria of job 
performance and aggressive and counterproductive behavior including lack of 
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truthfulness about extra credit, absences, conduct violations, attrition, theft, and hard 
fouls in intramural basketball games.  These values suggest that a benefit of CRTs may 
not only be a reduction in faking due to the implicit nature of the test but also an increase 
in the ability to measure personality.  However, a recent meta-analysis of the Aggression 
CRT (Berry, Sackett, & Tobares, 2010) found that validity estimates are more likely in 
the range of .14 to .16 (depending on criteria) but may be as high as .24 to .26 when 
predicting continuous criteria, similar to traditional, Likert-type personality tests.   
Although CRT items appear to be logical reasoning problems, the relationship of 
cognitive ability and the CRT-A has been consistently found to be nonsignificant (James 
et al., 2005; LeBreton et al., 2007).  Correlations between the CRT-A and cognitive 
ability (ACT scores) across multiple studies range from -.08 to .06 (all nonsignificant; N 
= 95-832).  The CRT-A often has low and nonsignificant correlations with self-report 
measures of personality.  James et al. (2005) investigated the correlations between scores 
on an Aggression CRT and several self-report measures of Aggression including the 
Personality Research Form (PRF), the NEO-PI-R, and the aggression questionnaire.  
Correlations between the Aggression, Dominance, and Impulsivity subscales of the PRF 
ranged from .05 to .14 (nonsignificant; N = 60).  Correlations between the Aggression 
CRT and the NEO-PI-R were .002 (nonsignificant; N = 191) and .26 (p<.05; N = 225) 
for the Angry Hostility subscale and -.18 (p<.05; N = 225) for the Dutifulness subscale.  
Lastly, the relationship between the aggression questionnaire and the Aggression CRT 
was .24 (p< .05; N = 95).  The lack of substantial overlap may not indicate absence of 
convergent validity, however.  James et al. (2005) argue that explicit and implicit 
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measures of personality tap into different aspects of personality and, therefore, should 
not be expected to produce high correlations.  Indeed, relatively low correlations are 
frequently found between explicit and implicit measures in the extant literature 
(Bornstein, 2002; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 
1989).  In order to determine the relative proportion of R
2
 attributable to the conditional 
reasoning test or self-report measures, a dominance analysis was performed (James et 
al., 2005).  The contribution of the Aggression CRT to the prediction of aggressive 
behavior predicted by personality was 83% for lack of truthfulness about extra credit, 
78% for student conduct violations, 72% for theft, and 74% for hard fouls in basketball.  
In comparison, the relative importance of self-report measures in the prediction of 
aggressive behaviors ranged from 1% to 28%. 
The current study investigated the validity of a CRT for measuring 
Agreeableness and Extraversion.  For the test to have any utility in practice, it is 
necessary to ensure that these tests are in fact measuring what their intended constructs 
are and/or they predict important outcomes.  Also, due to the onerous development 
process involved with conditional reasoning tests and the increased time required to 
administer the measure, it is important to compare their validity to Likert-type 
personality tests.  There are a number of ways to compare the validity of one test to the 
validity of another test.  Two options will be examined as part of this study.  First, zero-
order correlations between the test and construct-relevant outcomes should be present for 
the CRTs as well as the traditional personality tests.  Validity coefficients should be of 
roughly the same magnitude between the two tests.  In addition, a rigorous test of 
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validity will be conducted to determine if the CRT can provide any more explanation of 
variance than the traditional personality tests do.  If evidence of the incremental validity 
of CRTs over and above traditional personality tests exists, then there would be ample 
evidence that CRTs are superior to traditional tests.  Therefore, the following hypotheses 
are offered:  
Hypothesis 1: Traditional, self-report personality tests for Agreeableness and 
Extraversion will be positively correlated to construct-relevant criteria. 
Hypothesis 2: CRTs for Agreeableness and Extraversion will be positively 
correlated to construct-relevant criteria. 
Hypothesis 3: CRTs for Agreeableness and Extraversion will have incremental 
validity in the prediction of construct-relevant outcomes over and above 
traditional tests of these constructs. 
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CHAPTER VI 
JUSTIFICATION MECHANISMS OF EXTRAVERSION AND 
AGREEABLENESS 
 
Research on the trait theories of personality, such as the Big Five, has largely 
focused on the description of the traits as opposed to underlying mechanisms.  
Therefore, it was necessary to undertake a review of the literature from the inception of 
these traits to have an understanding of the justification mechanisms people use to 
rationalize their behavior.  According to social cognitive theory of personality (Bandura, 
1986), the underlying mechanisms of personality are unique to the individual, based on 
their past experiences.  However, research has identified several common themes upon 
which these personality traits have been built (Allport & Allport, 1921).  These serve as 
the justification mechanisms on which the current CRT items will be based.   
Before discussing the justification mechanisms (JMs) for both Extraversion and 
Agreeableness, it is important to understand how personality forms and what gives rise 
to the rationalizations for behavior that determine what each construct’s JM will be.  
Based on a review of several philosophical, sociological, psychological, literary, and 
religious conceptualizations, Allport (1937) defined personality as “the dynamic 
organization, within the individual, of those psychophysical systems that determine his 
unique adjustments to his environment” (p. 48).  Allport (1921; 1924; 1937) recognized 
the importance of the environment, and an individual’s response to it, in the shaping of 
personality.  Personalities form from the multitude of experiences to which people have 
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been exposed.  People are born with a temperament and this temperament combines with 
influences from the environment to form a person’s personality (Deal, Halverson, Havill, 
& Martin, 2005).  The behaviors that have proven adaptive to the environment in the 
past combine to become personalities; these behaviors are indirect signs of personality 
(Mischel, 1972).   
Research has shown that infants possess a number of innate temperaments that 
lead them into particular environments where temperament-consistent behaviors can be 
reinforced (Martin, Wisenbaker, & Huttunen, 1994; Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & Fisher, 
2001).  For example, infants who are low in sociability tend to find social situations 
intimidating and wish to avoid them.  These infants are more likely to engage in 
behaviors that are inwardly focused.  From an adaptive standpoint, these types of 
behaviors serve the function of buffering the individual from social situations, while 
reducing the individual’s discomfort and stress, and are therefore likely to be repeated in 
the future (Thorndike, 1927).  Allport (1937) affirmed that this process is unique to each 
individual; things that may seem maladaptive to one person can be seen as adaptive to 
another.    
Although these responses transpire because they were adaptive in the past and 
thus reinforced, over the course of time, they become habits to the individual and 
eventually become integrated as personalities.  Allport (1937) argued that personality 
begins at birth, although babies do not innately have personalities when they are born.  
In a process called differentiation, babies exhibit random actions and predetermined 
reflexes to generate individual skills.  These skills are maintained through differences in 
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sensitivity to the external world and innate drives such as hunger and thirst to produce 
individual differences in temperament and potential for adaptive behavior.  For example, 
an infant, through random motor movement can eventually become skilled at producing 
different facial expressions.  In addition, infants are especially sensitive to environmental 
stimuli (Parry, 1972) and are thus likely to use their newly acquired skills to better adapt 
to it.  The facial expressions that develop as an infant could be further refined through 
interactions with the environment.  If these facial expressions happen to produce an 
initial positive reaction from the mother, the infant may further refine facial movements 
toward a specific expression, such as smiling.  Through a process called integration, 
Allport (1937) believes that conditioned reflexes (such as the smiling mentioned above) 
become habits, or integrated systems of conditioned responses.  These habits are then 
further environmentally conditioned such that particular situations (and situations similar 
to it) induce these habits naturally.  For example, smiling may produce positive reactions 
not only from the mother but also other people whom the individual encounters.  
Therefore, the individual learns to smile when meeting new people for the first time 
because it has been adaptive in the past, becoming a habit.  Finally, through further 
adaptive interaction with one’s own environment, the integration of several habits forms 
the basis of traits.  Perhaps an individual not only smiles in response to meeting someone 
for the first time but also engages in small talk and listens to what the other individual 
has to say.  From another person’s point of view, it may seem as though this individual is 
friendly or outgoing but it is really an integrated set of habits, which have allowed the 
individual to adapt to his or her environment. 
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Extraversion Justification Mechanisms 
It is believed that Introversion and Extraversion arise from adaptations made to 
one’s social environment at a young age (Allport, 1921).  People are inclined to repeat 
behaviors that they find rewarding (Thorndike, 1927) and different personalities arise 
because different people find different situations rewarding.  For example, one person 
may find social interactions to be rewarding because they can gain approval from others.  
However, if a person is ignored or teased by others they may find the social world to be 
intimidating and choose instead to focus inward, engaging in a marked fantasy life 
characterized by high imagination and daydreaming.  By exploring the underlying 
differences between these two groups, a list of justification mechanisms can be 
determined.  The following justification mechanisms for Extraversion were obtained 
through a literature review of seminal work in the field of personality research and 
theory.  This section will explain the findings of the literature review and describe the 
justification mechanisms in which people with Extraversion and Introversion engage.    
High versus low arousal.  Carl Jung introduced the terms Extraversion and 
Introversion when he was examining personality types in abnormal psychology (Wilt & 
Revelle, 2009).  However, Hans Eysenck found that Introversion and Extraversion had a 
biological basis related to the excitation and inhibition in the brain (Eysenck, 1967).  
Introverts had lower thresholds for activation than extroverts, which would lead 
introverts to perform better than extroverts in low arousal conditions and extraverts to 
perform better than introverts in high arousal conditions, thus avoiding under or over 
arousal.  In addition, Eysenck believed that in conditions of moderate arousal, extraverts 
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should act more frequently and quickly in order to increase their general level of arousal.  
Eysenck’s arousal theory has received support (Matthews & Gilliland, 1999); introverts 
are more likely to feel aroused than extraverts, especially in the morning. 
As an alternative to arousal theory, Gray (1970) introduced the reinforcement 
sensitivity theory to explain Introversion and Extraversion.  The reinforcement 
sensitivity theory argues a psychophysiological cause for Introversion and Extraversion 
through the behavioral approach and behavioral inhibition systems.  Gray argued that 
sensitivities in these areas lead to either impulsivity (behavioral approach system, 
associated with Extraversion) or anxiety (behavioral inhibition system, associated with 
Introversion).  Based on the reinforcement sensitivity theory, extraverts should be 
quicker to condition than introverts because they are more sensitive to reinforcers.  In 
addition, extraverts should have higher positive affect than introverts.  Research has 
supported both hypotheses; extraverts possess higher positive affect than introverts and 
extraverts condition to reinforcers more quickly (Matthews & Gilliland, 1999).   
High versus low positive affectivity.  In general, Extraversion is related to state 
and trait tendencies to experience positive affect (happiness and excitability; Watson & 
Clark, 1997; Wilt & Revelle, 2009).  Extraverts have a lower threshold for experiencing 
positive affect than introverts and extraverts require less stimulation than introverts to 
feel positive affect (Gross, Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998).  Although one may assume that 
extraverts have greater positive affect than introverts because they spend more time in 
social situations, research has not overwhelmingly supported this assertion.  Research 
suggests that extraverts are happier than introverts in both social and nonsocial 
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environments and that introverts do not necessarily spend less time in social situations 
(Wilt & Revelle, 2009).    
Objective versus inner worlds.  Allport (1921) describes Introversion and 
Extraversion in terms of the internal versus the external world.  Although this is a 
rudimentary definition of Introversion and Extraversion, it provides important insight 
into a potential component of Introversion and Extraversion.  The introvert views the 
external world as lacking in some form and instead prefers to focus inward into an 
imaginary world where experiences can be rich and rewarding.  The extravert finds the 
social world more rewarding and finds little practicality in the inward self.  Creativity for 
the introvert and realism for the extrovert allow the individual to adapt to his or her 
environment.   
Confidence versus embarrassment.  Allport and Allport (1921) describe 
extroverts as ones whose “mental images, thoughts, and problems find ready expression 
in overt behavior” (p. 12).  In other words, an extravert speaks his or her mind without 
worrying what others think about their thoughts; they have nothing to hide.  An introvert 
“dwells largely in a realm of imagination, creating inwardly a more desirable ideal world 
rather than adjusting himself outwardly to the real one” (p. 12).  Introverts are self-
searching and may be afraid of exposing their vulnerabilities when expressing 
themselves (i.e., are sensitive to social situations and are afraid of embarrassing 
themselves). 
Expansion versus reclusion.  It is necessary to discuss some traits that may be 
components of Introversion and Extroversion in order to fully understand the construct.  
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Dominance (also called ascension) and submission are two personal characteristics that 
become evident in social situations (Allport 1924; 1937).  Submissive qualities are a 
component of Introversion and domineering qualities reflect Extroversion.  Submission 
is characterized by feeling self-conscious in the presence of powerful others.  Dominant 
qualities include asserting oneself in a given situation and actively struggling against 
others (Allport & Allport, 1921).  Related are Allport’s (1921) explanations of expansion 
and reclusion.  People who exhibit expansion find it easy to talk to others, particularly 
when expressing their opinions.  Expansive people insert themselves (and their 
personalities) into conversations with others.  Reclusive people find it difficult to open 
up about themselves or to insert their own opinions.  While expansion and reclusion are 
not mutually inclusive of Introversion and Extroversion, they are related at least in the 
current definitions of Introversion and Extroversion.  Some of the first measurements of 
expansion involve the number of times respondents express their personal views or the 
number of times they use personal pronouns when speaking.  
Growing versus dwelling.  Introverts spend a great deal of time engaging in 
self-evaluation whereas extroverts do not dwell on the self frequently or for long periods 
of time.  Allport (1921) also mentions the relative importance of the opinions of others; 
extroverts care little about what others have to say about them while introverts dwell on 
the potential criticisms of others.  Additionally, introverts retain experiences of praise or 
blame in memory for long periods of time because of their preoccupation with the 
opinions of others; extraverts tend to ignore or forget their failures.  Related to the fear 
associated with being perceived negatively by others, introverts tend to take things 
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personally.  The extrovert is unconcerned with social evaluation.  Lastly, Allport 
describes extroverts as being tough-minded and having a pragmatic outlook on life 
whereas introverts are sensitive in feeling and idealistic.  Allport (1937) also states that 
there are emotional components of Introversion-Extraversion; introverts are sensitive to 
emotions and delay expression of emotions or react to stimuli in bizarre ways, whereas 
extraverts display emotions in a natural way.  When dealing with conflicts, extraverts 
deal with them in person, while introverts internalize them and handle them in their own 
fantasy world. 
Influence versus passivity. Extroverts seek the company of others and despise 
being alone; introverts find comfort in solitude and avoid the company of others.  In 
addition, extraverts create a positive social environment and can actually change the 
behavior and affect of the people with whom they are interacting (Eaton & Funder, 
2003).  Extraverts are more likely than introverts to believe that the world is a positive 
place and to judge neutral events as positive (Uziel, 2006).  Extraversion has also been 
found to be related to a drive for social contact, power, status, and intimacy (Wilt & 
Revelle, 2009).  Extraverts are more likely to seek and attain high status and 
accomplishments, fun and excitement, and opportunities to lead and influence others 
(Wilt & Revelle, 2009).  See Table 2 for a summary of justification mechanisms for 
Extraversion. 
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Table 2 
Justification Mechanisms for Extraversion
 
1. High versus low arousal: Introverts perform better in low arousal situations while 
Extraverts perform better in high arousal situations.  Extraverts will increase the 
frequency and intensity of behaviors in moderate arousal situations to increase their 
arousal levels. 
 
2. High versus low positive affectivity: Extraverts have higher positive affect 
(happiness and excitability).  Extraverts have lower threshold for positive affect and 
require less stimulation to experience positive affect. 
 
3. Objective versus inner worlds: Extraverts focus on the outside, objective world 
while introverts focus on the inner world.  Extraverts deal with problems externally, 
while introverts deal with problems internally, in a fantasy world.  Introverts find the 
real world lacking but their internal world as rewarding.  Extraverts see the real 
world as rewarding and find focusing inward impractical.  Characteristics used to 
describe Introversion/Extraversion: idealism (Introversion) and pragmatism 
(Extraversion). 
 
4. Confidence versus embarrassment: Introverts are afraid of being teased by others 
or embarrassing themselves.  Therefore, they find social situations intimidating and 
become self-conscious.  This often stems from negative attachment experiences 
(humiliation or being ignored) as a child.  Extraverts care little about what others 
have to say about them. 
 
5. Expansion versus reclusion: Extraverts find it easy to talk about themselves and 
talk about their opinions.  Introverts find it difficult to open up about themselves. 
 
6. Growing versus dwelling: Introverts spend time in self-evaluation; extraverts do 
not dwell on such things.  Introverts keep memories of blame and praise for long 
periods of time; extraverts ignore or forget their failures.  Introverts are more likely 
to take things personally. 
 
7. Influence versus passivity: Extraverts see the world as a positive place and are 
likely to actually change the social situation by changing the behavior and emotions 
of others with whom they are interacting. 
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Agreeableness Justification Mechanisms  
In general, Agreeableness pertains to the qualities of being likable and pleasant 
and seeking good relations with others.  Per social cognitive theory and the law of effect, 
Agreeableness is thought to arise due to the repeated engagement in agreeable behaviors 
that are beneficial to the individual (Cervone et al., 2001; Thorndike, 1927).  Those who 
are high in the trait of Agreeableness may find that by being pleasant and likeable, others 
will treat them positively (a direct benefit) and may provide them with social support 
that may help them accomplish tasks.  Those low in Agreeableness also see their 
personality as positive.  For example, those low in Agreeableness may have pursued 
their own wants and needs by acting competitively instead of cooperatively with others.  
They are likely to achieve their goals by making others fail and receive rewards on their 
own.  These ideas will be explored in more detail with the discussion of the justification 
mechanisms for Agreeableness. 
Getting along versus getting ahead.  Some people modify their actions in the 
interest of others while some are concerned about their own self-interests.  This 
characteristic is known as altruism and self-seeking according to Allport (1937).  Those 
who help others in need report that engaging in these behaviors makes them feel good 
(Graziano & Tobin, 2009).  This feeling of goodwill can serve as a motivator to continue 
to engage in such acts and the repeated engagement in behaviors that elicit that feeling 
will eventually lead to the development of an altruistic self; one who is empathetic with 
the plights of others and works cooperatively to help them attain their goals.  Those high 
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in Agreeableness likely see cooperation as a positive trait and are cooperative with most 
people.  Those low in Agreeableness may still strive for others, just not many others.   
Another trait related to Agreeableness is something Allport (1937) labeled social 
intelligence.  Social intelligence involves recognizing what is needed in a given social 
situation and adjusting one’s behaviors to act in accordance to those needs.  Social 
intelligence involves being flexible in social situations, tailoring one’s needs to ensure 
smooth social interactions (a construct similar to self-monitoring; Snyder, 1974).  Those 
who utilize one social tactic throughout all interactions lack this trait.  Low social 
intelligence may also be characterized by social rebellion, espousing one’s personal 
values when they are contrary to established custom.  For example, a person who shows 
up for a job interview for a high-level position wearing shorts instead of a business suit 
is exhibiting low social intelligence.  Although some people may engage in the same 
behavior out of ignorance, those exceptionally low in Agreeableness desire to rebel and 
dresses how he or she pleases because of rugged individualism.   
Sympathy versus retaliation.  People high in Agreeableness are more likely 
than their less agreeable counterparts to see others in a positive light and to make 
excuses for other’s shortcomings (Graziano & Tobin, 2009).  Because engaging in these 
behaviors is likely to produce new friendships, those high in Agreeableness are likely to 
see them as positive, continue to engage in them in the future and to incorporate them 
into the sense of self.  High Agreeableness is associated with perceiving less conflict in 
social interactions, transforming competitive situations into cooperative ones and using 
more constructive conflict resolution techniques (Graziano & Tobin, 2009).  
 43 
 
Presumably, agreeable people engage in these behaviors so they can avoid the negative 
affect they experience due to conflict.  Those low in Agreeableness are more likely than 
those high in Agreeableness to see destructive tactics (such as physical force) in conflict 
resolution as beneficial.  People who are low in Agreeableness see competitive situations 
as a way for them to excel over others.   
Situational adaptiveness versus rigidity.  Because people high in 
Agreeableness want to maintain positive relationships with others, they are likely to 
inhibit any negative emotions that stem from an interaction (Jensen-Campbell & 
Graziano, 2001).  Similarly, Agreeableness has been linked to effortful self-control, 
particularly in the regulation of negative affect such as anger and frustration (Ahadi & 
Rothbart, 1994).  Those high in Agreeableness apply different tactics in response to 
different situations (Jensen-Campbell & Graziano, 2001).  Agreeableness has been found 
to be highly related to impression management, a facet of socially-desirable responding 
mentioned in an earlier chapter (Graziano & Tobin, 2002).  Impression management 
involves the purposeful tailoring of responses to impress an audience (Paulhus, 1991).  
These pieces of evidence suggest that people high in Agreeableness are likely to change 
their behaviors in responses to situations while those low in Agreeableness are likely to 
remain rigid to their tactics in social interactions. 
Absolution versus blame.  People who are high in Agreeableness want to have 
positive interactions with others and are likely to behave in ways to meet that end.  
Research has shown that people who are high in Agreeableness project positive 
attributes onto others and make excuses for their shortcomings (Graziano & Tobin, 
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2009).  There are two reasons why this may occur.  First, those high in Agreeableness 
are more likely to experience empathy with others, particularly seeing the world through 
other people’s eyes and feeling the suffering of others (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & 
Tobin, 2007).  When one experiences empathy with others, it is likely that they will 
attribute the shortcomings of others to external causes instead of internal causes and 
therefore make excuses.  The norm of reciprocity may also influence how those high in 
Agreeableness approach an interpersonal interaction.  The norm of reciprocity states that 
in social exchanges, people will counter in kind when they have been treated well by 
others (Gouldner, 1960).  People who are high in Agreeableness are motivated to engage 
in positive relations with others (Digman, 1990; Graziano & Tobin, 2009).  Those who 
are high on Agreeableness may believe that others will reciprocate with Agreeableness 
when they engage in positive social behaviors, leading them to bestow positive traits on 
others.  In fact, Graziano and Tobin (2002) found that people who described themselves 
as more Agreeable also saw others as more Agreeable.  Furthermore, they perceive 
almost all others with a “leniency bias,” finding positives even in persons with whom 
they are in conflict. 
Empathy versus apathy and outgroup versus ingroup helping. In general, 
those high in Agreeableness are more likely than those low in Agreeableness to help 
others and this is especially so when considering a wide range of others including 
outgroup members even when the cost of helping is high (Graziano et al., 2007).  
Similarly, Agreeableness is also associated with a lower endorsement of prejudice and 
prejudiced reactions even when justification of such beliefs is available (Graziano et al., 
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2007).  The mechanism through which this behavior occurs is Agreeableness’ 
relationship to empathetic concern.  Those high in Agreeableness are better able to see 
the world through other people’s points of view and to sympathize with others’ emotions 
leading to increased empathy with others.  See Table 3 for a summary of justification 
mechanisms for Agreeableness. 
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Table 3 
Justification Mechanisms for Agreeableness
 
1. Getting along versus getting ahead: Both high and low Agreeableness are 
seeking to get ahead, but high Agreeableness does so through cooperation with 
others, low Agreeableness does so through competition.  High Agreeableness 
related to transforming competitive situations into cooperative ones. 
 
2. Sympathy versus retaliation: Low Agreeableness individuals believe that they 
are justified in treating others poorly because they are often retaliating against 
someone who treated them poorly first. 
 
3. Situational adaptiveness versus rigidity: Those high in Agreeableness will 
change their behavior to fit the appropriateness of the situation. 
 
4. Absolution versus blame: Those high in Agreeableness see others in positive 
light and make excuses for the shortcomings of others. 
 
5. Empathy versus apathy: Those high in Agreeableness experience empathy, 
seeing the world through someone else’s eyes. 
 
6. Outgroup versus ingroup helping: Those high in Agreeableness will help 
ingroup and outgroup members while those low in Agreeableness are more likely 
to help only ingroup members.  Those high in Agreeableness will help others 
even when the cost of helping is high.  High Agreeableness people endorse less 
prejudiced ideals even when there is justification for such behaviors. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE CURRENT STUDY: FAKING ON TRADITIONAL PERSONALITY TESTS 
AND CONDITIONAL REASONING TESTS FOR EXTRAVERSION AND 
AGREEABLENESS 
 
Traditional Personality Tests 
The current project focuses on developing CRTs for two factors of the Big Five: 
Extraversion and Agreeableness and investigates the impact of faking for both traditional 
and conditional reasoning tests.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, previous research has found 
that for traditional personality tests, people have the ability to fake when instructed to do 
so (Hough et al., 1990; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), therefore, the following hypothesis 
for the current study is proposed: 
Hypothesis 4:  Test takers will be able to fake on traditional personality tests 
when instructed to do so such that test scores for individuals in a “fake good” 
condition will have higher mean scores than individuals in an honest response 
condition. 
Test characteristics may also impact whether or not a test taker has the ability or 
opportunity to fake.  Faking on cognitive ability tests is difficult because these tests only 
have one logical answer.  The purpose of traditional personality tests is to identify 
whether (or to what extent) an individual possesses a particular characteristic and, 
therefore, has many logically plausible answers.  This is the reasoning for the continued 
concern over the faking of non-cognitive measures.  If test takers are notified that the 
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test they are about to take is a personality test, it is likely to reinforce the subjective 
nature of personality and signal the ability and opportunity to fake on such a test.  
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 5:  Differences will exist when the true nature of the traditional 
personality test is revealed such that mean scores on the personality test will be small, 
yet significantly higher when test takers are told the test they are about to take is a 
personality test than when they are not directly told it is a personality test. 
As mentioned earlier, Extraversion and Agreeableness are important predictors 
of job-related outcomes (Barrick et al., 2001; Hough & Furnham, 2003).  While other 
factors of the Big Five may contribute to a larger proportion of variance in job 
performance, Extraversion and Agreeableness are influenced by socially desirable 
responding (Paulhus & John, 1998).  Paulhus and John (1998) report that self-deceptive 
enhancement correlates most positively with Extraversion and Openness to Experience 
while impression management correlates most positively with Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness.  When selecting these particular constructs, careful consideration 
was given to the amount of research dedicated to the underlying motives of these traits 
because that is how justification mechanisms can be identified.  Agreeableness and 
Extraversion both have a long history of theoretical development (Allport & Allport, 
1921; Thorndike, 1927). 
Paulhus and John (1998) describe different types of biases associated with self-
deception: egoistic bias and moralistic bias.  Egoistic bias describes the tendency to 
exaggerate one’s social and intellectual status and is argued to be rooted in the 
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perception of an individual to act upon the social world.  This egoistic bias results in a 
motive to express personality dimensions such as Power, Dominance, Fearlessness, 
Emotional Stability, Intellect, and Creativity.  Alternatively, the moralistic bias involves 
self-deception and derives from a need to seek approval from others.  The moralistic bias 
results in a tendency to eschew socially deviant impulses, instead espousing “saint-like 
qualities” such as Agreeableness, Dutifulness, and Nurturance (Paulhus & John, 1998, 
pp. 1026).  Factor analyses have supported these distinctions, confirming two self-
favorability factors (Paulhus & John, 1998).  Data suggest that the egoistic bias is indeed 
comprised of Extraversion, Dominance, Intellect, and Openness and the moralistic bias 
is comprised of Agreeableness, Dutifulnesss, and Nurturance.   
Agreeableness has been found to be related to self-deception and Extraversion 
has been found to be related to impression management (Paulhus & John, 1998).  It is 
likely that characteristics related to impression management are more susceptible to 
faking because this type of faking is more likely to be conscious to the test taker.  
Characteristics that are related to self-deception on the other hand are likely to be less 
susceptible to faking because the test taker is not aware of their own status regarding the 
personality trait.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 6: Traditional personality tests of Extraversion will be more 
susceptible to faking as evidenced by mean score differences than traditional 
tests of Agreeableness.  
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Conditional Reasoning Tests 
The current study will also test whether a new conditional reasoning test intended 
to measure Agreeableness and Extraversion is impervious to faking by test takers.  It has 
been argued that the implicit nature of conditional reasoning tests circumvents the 
potential problem of faking because people are unable to alter that of which they are 
unaware (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2003).  It is unclear as to whether it is the 
implicit nature of the test (as has been suggested by James and colleagues) or whether it 
is the obfuscation of the true nature of the test (i.e., presented the test as a measure of 
reasoning ability instead of personality) that is responsible for the resistance to faking on 
CRTs.  This study will directly examine this issue.  As mentioned previously, CRTs are 
purported to measure aspects of personality that occur outside one’s own consciousness.  
People can distort their responses on personality tests because they see themselves too 
positively (i.e., self-deception; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Paulhus & John, 1998).  
Because CRTs are designed to tap into subconscious motives that theoretically underlie 
traits, CRTs should effectively circumvent the social desirability of traits.  In addition, 
the concealed purpose of the test prohibits test takers from knowing the best way to fake 
a test and will result in decreased faking as compared to a test whose true purpose is 
known.  CRTs are designed to look like an inductive reasoning test.  People who are 
intentionally distorting their responses will try to select the most rational response 
without regard for personality traits.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 7: Test takers will not be able to fake on conditional reasoning tests 
when instructed to do so such that test scores for individuals in a “fake good” 
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condition will not be significantly different than the test scores of individuals in 
an honest response condition. 
Hypothesis 8: Conditional reasoning tests will be less susceptible to faking than 
traditional personality tests as evidenced by standardized mean score differences. 
A CRT should reduce faking because it misleads fakers to the purpose of the test.  
Although the benefits of CRTs as a way to eliminate faking concerns have been 
widely theorized in the literature, only one study to date has empirically tested this claim 
(LeBreton et al, 2007).  LeBreton et al. (2007) investigated the impact of preserving the 
obfuscated purpose of the test on faking.  The authors found that once the true nature of 
the CRT as a personality test was revealed, participants were able to distort their 
responses on the test (partial η2 = .83).  However, when the true nature of the test was 
not revealed to participants, no mean differences were found for scores on an Aggression 
CRT under “fake good” and control conditions.  LeBreton et al. (2007) argued that when 
the purpose of the test is revealed to participants, the measure becomes explicit as 
opposed to implicit and is therefore susceptible to faking.  The test is susceptible to 
faking when the true nature of the test remains hidden.  It is important to investigate 
whether the same effects apply to other constructs besides Aggression.   
Hypothesis 9: Conditional reasoning tests for Agreeableness and Extraversion 
will only be resistant to faking when the purpose of the test is not revealed to 
participants.  When the purpose of the test is revealed to participants, mean score 
differences will be higher when participants are instructed to “fake good” than 
when participants are instructed to respond honestly. 
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If, indeed, CRTs become explicit tests when the true nature of the test is 
revealed, then they in essence operate similar to traditional personality tests.  Although 
the difference between scores when instructed to fake good or respond honestly are 
likely to have only slight effects for traditional personality tests, the impact of the 
revelation that the test is a personality test will have a profound impact on the CRT.  
Hypothesis 10: There will be a greater impact of the revelation of the purpose of 
the test on faking for CRTs compared to traditional personality tests.   
Because it is hypothesized that CRTs will only be resistant to faking when the 
purpose of the test is concealed from the test taker, standardized mean score differences 
for the “fake good” and honest responding conditions will be smallest (i.e., least impact 
of faking) for the CRT when the purpose of the test is not revealed.  There will be larger 
standardized mean score differences for faking (i.e., greater impact of faking) for the 
traditional personality test when the purpose of the test is not revealed because the 
traditional test is an explicit test.  It is expected that there will be slightly greater 
standardized mean score differences in faking for the traditional personality test when 
the purpose of the test is revealed and that when the purpose of the test is revealed for 
the CRT, standardized mean score differences in faking will be similar to the traditional 
test.   
From a theoretical standpoint, it is interesting to study the ability of CRTs to 
deter faking of egoistic and moralistic factors.  The two factors have different motives 
that drive different types of faking (i.e., self-deception and impression management).  
Because of the unique ability of CRTs to tap into people’s rationalizations, it may be 
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easier (or more difficult) for people to fake constructs that are related to self-deception 
or impression management.  In particular, it may be more difficult for individuals to fake 
on an Agreeableness CRT where the moralistic bias arises because the justification 
mechanisms (JMs) are more deeply ingrained.  Similarly, it may be easier to fake the 
Extraversion CRT because it is related to the egotistic bias and the JMs are more 
superficial.  These differences may become more pronounced if the true nature of the 
CRT as a measure of personality is revealed.  By revealing the true nature of the test, test 
takers are likely to be cued into the fact that response options are designed to 
differentiate between low and high levels of a particular personality trait.  After reading 
all of the response options, test takers may be more likely to see that two of the response 
options are comprised of opposite conclusions to the item prompt and therefore are 
likely the responses that are related to the personality trait.  For traits related to the 
egoistic bias, such as Extraversion, it may be easier for test takers to see the logical 
appeal of both personality response options since the JMs are not as deeply held.  For 
example, assume that a test taker is aware of the fact that they are low in Extraversion 
but are being driven to respond in a way that would present himself as high in 
Extraversion.  If the true nature of the test is revealed, the test taker may be better able to 
mentally label the two personality congruent response options as representing either high 
or low Extraversion.  Because both response options are valid and the JMs for 
Extraversion are more superficial, it may be easier for the low Extraversion test taker to 
simply choose the response option that is opposite of the way he truly feels.  However, 
for traits related to the moralistic bias, such as Agreeableness, the JMs are more deeply 
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ingrained and it becomes much more difficult for the test taker to see the opposing 
response option as logical.  Given that the test taker is instructed to choose the logical 
response, and two of the response options are clearly illogical, the only choice the test 
taker has is to select the option that aligns with his personality.  Based on this reasoning, 
Hypothesis 11: For the conditional reasoning tests, the Extraversion construct 
will be more susceptible to faking than the Agreeableness construct as evidenced 
by mean score differences. 
 The process of completing a CRT involves the indirect measurement of the 
constructs being tested.  In traditional personality tests, the process is overt, making it 
theoretically easier to fake on these tests.  While the type of construct being measured 
(i.e., egoistic or moralistic factors) is likely to influence responding in both types of 
personality tests, the propensity of egoistic factors to be more susceptible to faking is 
likely to have a more pronounced impact in the traditional personality tests where there 
is no competing forces from justification mechanisms.  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 12: There will be a greater impact of the type of construct (egoistic or 
moralistic) on faking for the traditional personality test than the CRT such that 
standardized mean score differences for the “fake good” and honest responding 
conditions is greatest (i.e., more impact of faking) for the traditional Extraversion 
test, followed by the traditional Agreeableness test, the Extraversion CRT, and 
the Agreeableness CRT. 
Taking all hypotheses together, a pattern of expected relationships emerges 
among all four factors (construct, faking, type of test, purpose of test) in the current 
 55 
 
study.  For traditional tests, test takers are expected to be able to fake when instructed to 
do so, leading to higher mean differences for those in the “fake good” condition 
compared to the honest responding condition (Hypothesis 4).  Additionally, it is 
expected for traditional tests that there will be a small, yet significant, increase in the 
ability to fake when the purpose of the test is revealed instead of when it is kept hidden 
(Hypothesis 5).  It is also expected that it will be easier to fake the Extraversion 
construct compared to the Agreeableness construct (Hypothesis 6).  For CRTs, it is 
expected that test takers will have difficulty faking these tests (Hypothesis 7) compared 
to traditional personality tests (Hypothesis 8), but only when the true purpose of the test 
remains hidden (Hypotheses 9 and 10).  The Agreeableness CRT will be more difficult 
to fake than the Extraversion CRT (Hypothesis 11); however, the impact of the type of 
construct being measured is greater for traditional tests than CRTs (Hypothesis 12).  
Therefore,  
Hypothesis 13: The type of test, construct, and the purpose of the test will 
interact to produce significant differences in faking. 
Standardized mean score differences between the “fake good” and honest 
responding conditions will be the least (i.e., little effect of faking) for the Agreeableness 
CRT when the purpose of the test is not revealed.  There will be a slightly greater impact 
of faking (i.e., higher standardized mean score differences) for the Extraversion CRT 
when the purpose of the test is not revealed.  However, it is expected that once the 
purpose of the test is revealed, the CRT will function as an explicit test and standardized 
mean score differences for the “fake good” and honest responding conditions will be 
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similar to the traditional tests.  Standardized mean score differences between the “fake 
good” and honest responding conditions for the traditional test will be greater for the 
Agreeableness and Extraversion traditional personality tests when the purpose of the test 
as a personality measure is not revealed than the CRT when the purpose of the test as a 
personality measure is not revealed.  However, the Extraversion traditional test will have 
a greater impact of faking than the Agreeableness traditional test.  When the purpose of 
the test is revealed, standardized mean score differences between the “fake good” and 
honest responding conditions for both the traditional tests and CRTs will be greater than 
any of the previous conditions.  CRT and traditional tests of Extraversion will have the 
greatest impact of faking as evidenced by standardized mean score differences, followed 
by tests of Agreeableness.  Standardized mean score differences for these types of tests, 
when the purpose of the test is revealed, will be similar for CRTs and traditional tests.  
Please see Table 4 for a summary of study hypotheses. 
The current study investigates the impact of faking on a relatively new method of 
measurement, the conditional reasoning test.  In order to explore this research topic, it 
was necessary to create two new CRTs for Agreeableness and Extraversion.  For the 
current study, there are 4 main variables as evidenced by the hypotheses.  The current 
study investigates the impact of faking based on type of test (CRT vs. traditional), 
construct (Extraversion vs. Agreeableness), and whether or not the true purpose of the 
test is revealed.    
Participants were assigned to one of four experimental conditions.  Some factors 
were studied within subjects (type of test and construct) and others between subjects 
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(faking and revelation of the purpose of the test).  This design will require a smaller 
sample size for analysis and lead to more robust assertions than a complete between-
subjects design (Maxwell & Delaney, 2004).  A fully within-subjects design would be a 
more robust analysis; however, the time requirements for participants would be onerous 
and there may be issues with retest effects.  Therefore, it is necessary to counterbalance 
both the type of test and the construct being measured in order to remove a potential 
confounding order effects.  Order effects may occur when tests are closely presented in 
time to test takers.  Practice effects are defined as increase in a subject’s test score from 
one administration to the next in the absence of any interventions (Bartels, Wegrzyn, 
Wiedl, Ackermann, & Ehrenreich, 2010).  There are a number of reasons why practice 
effects may exist; however, the most important issue in this study is recall effects due to 
the minimal down time between tests.  Each participant is asked to complete all tests 
successively, and the likelihood that each may remember previous responses is great.   
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Table 4 
Study Hypotheses
 
Hypothesis 1:  Traditional, self-report personality tests for Agreeableness and Extraversion 
will be positively correlated to construct-relevant criteria. 
Hypothesis 2:  CRTs for Agreeableness and Extraversion will be positively correlated to 
construct-relevant criteria. 
Hypothesis 3: CRTs for Agreeableness and Extraversion will have incremental validity in 
the prediction of construct-relevant outcomes over and above traditional 
tests of these constructs. 
Hypothesis 4: Test takers will be able to fake on traditional personality tests when 
instructed to do so. 
Hypothesis 5: Differences will exist when the true nature of the traditional personality test 
is revealed than when it is kept hidden. 
Hypothesis 6: Traditional personality tests of Extraversion will be more susceptible to 
faking than traditional tests of Agreeableness. 
Hypothesis 7: Test takers will not be able to fake on CRTs when instructed to do so. 
Hypothesis 8: CRTs will be less susceptible to faking than traditional personality tests. 
Hypothesis 9: Conditional reasoning tests for Agreeableness and Extraversion will only be 
resistant to faking when the purpose of the test is not revealed to 
participants.   
Hypothesis 10: There will be a greater impact of the revelation of the purpose of the test on 
faking for CRTs compared to traditional personality tests.   
Hypothesis 11: For the conditional reasoning tests, the Extraversion construct will be more 
susceptible to faking than the Agreeableness construct. 
Hypothesis 12: There will be a greater impact of the type of construct on faking for the 
traditional personality test than the CRT. 
Hypothesis 13: The type of test, construct, and the purpose of the test will interact to 
produce significant differences in faking. 
 
Note. CRT: Conditional reasoning test. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through an online subject recruitment organization, 
StudyResponse.  StudyResponse is an academic recruitment website that agrees to email 
a link to the study to its current list of members for a fee.  In addition, StudyResponse 
sends reminder emails and prescreens participants based on qualifying criteria.  Previous 
research has shown that data collected from online recruiting sites are relatively similar 
to the data collected from student, other internet, and worker samples (Barger, & Sinar, 
2011; Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).  Due to the relatively high reading demands and 
cultural context of the CRT items used in this study, participants were prescreened for 
adequate U.S. English reading comprehension and were required to reside in the U.S.  
The study took approximately 1 hour to complete and respondents were financially 
compensated for their time in accordance with the minimum pay rate suggested by 
StudyResponse ($10 per hour).   
Using G*Power, an a priori power analysis was conducted to determine the 
minimum sample size required to detect effects within the study (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007).  A total sample size of 176 (11 per condition) is required in order to 
achieve an acceptable power level (.90) to detect small effects (d = .25).  This value 
includes two extra factors for counterbalancing the type of test (traditional and CRT) and 
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the construct (Agreeableness and Extraversion) so as to reduce test-retest effects.  In 
order to ensure that the final sample contained the needed number of participants, a 
sample size of 208 (13 per condition) was sought from StudyResponse.  This 
oversampling allowed the researcher to omit cases due to missing data, if needed. 
Thirty-one participants were excluded from analyses either based on missing data 
(when at least one predictor scale was missing) or when the amount of time taken to 
complete the study was below 30 minutes, indicating lack of engagement in the study.  
This resulted in a final sample of 187 participants.  Of these participants, 152 (81.3%) 
were Caucasian, 12 (6.4%) were Black, and 9 (4.8%) were Hispanic.  A total of 79 
(42.2%) participants were male and the average age of the group was 48.32 years of age 
(SD = 13.01).  Approximately 70% were members of the workforce. 
The mean age for this study was 48 years old (SD = 13).  Compared to many 
other studies which sample only college students, the age of this sample is more diverse 
and thus may be more generalizable to the working population.  The average level of 
education was between an Associate’s degree and a Bachelor’s degree and participants 
generally were native English speakers and could read and comprehend complex written 
English.  Based on this information, it is expected that the sample was able to understand 
the conditional reasoning test (CRT) items.   
Study Design and Methodology 
A within- and between-subjects, 2 (type of test) x 2 (test construct) x 2 (purpose 
of test) x 2 (faking condition) mixed design was utilized to test whether Agreeableness 
or Extraversion CRTs are fakeable and, if so, whether the fakeability is due to the 
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implicit nature of the test or the obfuscated nature of the items of the test.  The within-
subjects factors for this study were type of test (traditional or CRT) and construct 
(Agreeableness or Extraversion).  The between-subjects factors for this study were 
faking (“fake good” or honest responding) and (purpose of the test (revealed or not 
revealed).  Participants completed both a traditional, self-report and a conditional 
reasoning test for Extraversion and Agreeableness (2 x 2 within-subjects conditions).  
Half of the participants had the true nature of the tests (i.e., measurement of personality) 
revealed to them while others had the true nature of the tests not revealed (between-
subjects condition).  In addition, half of the participants were instructed to respond 
honestly to all the tests while half the participants were instructed to respond as though 
they were applying for a job that was attractive and required them to score high on 
Extraversion or Agreeableness (i.e., the “fake good” condition).  Participants also 
completed a demographics questionnaire, a manipulation check, measures of face 
validity, and several criterion measures.  
Participants were placed into experimental conditions using random assignment.  
At the beginning of the study, participants entered the last four digits of their telephone 
number.  The platform that hosted the survey, Qualtrics, then randomly placed 
participants in one of 16 experimental conditions.  These experimental conditions 
consisted of four levels of the two between-subjects factors (faking condition and 
purpose of test).  For each of the between-subjects conditions, there were a total of four 
possible combinations of the within-subjects factors (two levels of the two factors that 
were counterbalanced). This design represents a Latin Square design in which one 
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traditional personality test always follows the other traditional personality test and the 
conditional reasoning test always follows the other conditional reasoning test.  
Participants were placed into experimental conditions with the criteria that sample sizes 
for each were to remain relatively equal (N ~ 13).   
Measures 
Demographics questionnaire.  Participants completed a demographics 
questionnaire.  Participants were asked their age, sex, race, and level of educational 
attainment.  In addition, participants self-reported their U.S. residency and ability to read 
and understand the English language.  These last items were included in the 
questionnaire in order to verify that participants met study inclusion criteria. 
Traditional personality test.  The NEO-PI-R (Goldberg, 1999) was used as a 
“traditional” measure of Agreeableness and Extraversion.  This measure consisted of ten 
items per construct.  Data consisted of ratings of short phrases on a five-point scale 
(Very Inaccurate to Very Accurate).  An example of an Agreeableness item is, “I make 
friends easily” and an example of an Extraversion item is, “I feel comfortable around 
people.”  
Conditional reasoning tests.  Two conditional reasoning tests were developed 
by the researcher to assess Agreeableness and Extraversion.  The Agreeableness CRT 
consisted of 18 items and the Extraversion CRT consisted of 15 items.  Participants were 
required to read a short passage and select which option of four best answered the 
question in the item stem.  In the following paragraphs, the development of the CRTs is 
described.  
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The justification mechanisms for Agreeableness and Extraversion determined 
during the literature review process were empirically supported using an undergraduate 
student sample via an on-line survey.  First, 91 (74% female, 70% White) students’ 
personalities were assessed using the NEO-PI-R (10 items per facet; Goldberg, 1999).  
Participants were then asked to respond to several questions asking them to describe 
instances when they were particularly extraverted and introverted as well as particularly 
agreeable and disagreeable and to provide reasoning as to why they believed they 
behaved in that way.  An example item was “Think of a time when you were particularly 
outgoing, sociable, talkative, or assertive.  Describe the situation and how you reacted in 
the space below.  Also, why do you think you behaved in this way?  What was your 
interpretation of the events?”  After the data were collected, individuals scoring in the 10 
percent of highest or lowest Extraversion scores and the 10 percent highest and lowest 
Agreeableness scores were selected and their responses to the descriptions and 
explanations of the questions were examined.  Responses were content analyzed to 
provide evidence of the justification mechanisms developed through the literature 
review.  This step confirmed the existence of the previously described justification 
mechanisms for Agreeableness and Extraversion; no justification mechanisms were 
changed, added, or removed.  
A total of 18 Agreeableness items and 15 Extraversion items were created based 
on the justification mechanisms outlined in the introduction.  For each justification 
mechanism listed, several items were created.  The topic of these items was broad and 
typically focused on areas in which competing viewpoints, research, or conclusions 
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could be readily conceived.  Item topics were generated through two different strategies.  
Sometimes, current events were used as the foundation for items, but careful 
consideration was taken to ensure that item topics would not become obsolete in the 
future.  Also, responses from the highest and lowest Agreeableness and Extraversion 
scorers on the survey described in the preceding paragraph were used to generate item 
topics.  This step allowed the test author to generate items that were relevant to real-
world experiences.  Depending upon the topic that was chosen for a particular item, an 
item generation strategy was selected (see James, 1998 for a description of CRT item 
writing strategies).   
As a concrete example of the item generation process, I will explain the 
technique I used to create an Agreeableness CRT item.  Beginning with the justification 
mechanism “Social Adaptiveness versus Rigidity” (see Table 3), I selected an item 
generation technique by contemplating the meaning of the particular JM.  Social 
Adaptiveness versus Rigidity refers to the concept that those who are high in 
Agreeableness are more likely than those low in Agreeableness to change their behavior 
to fit the appropriateness of the situation.  Next, I imagined contexts in which Social 
Adaptiveness could be both appropriate and inappropriate depending upon the way a 
person looks at the situation.  For example, honesty is typically seen as a virtue and thus 
many people would believe that honesty is always a good quality to possess; however, 
others may believe that it is important to sometimes tell “little white lies” to others, 
particularly when it involves the feelings of others.  With this item content in mind, I 
chose the item generation strategy that seemed appropriate, in this case “Positive versus 
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Negative Consequences.”  If those high and low in Agreeableness deem the 
appropriateness of complete honesty differently, then it follows that these people would 
expect different outcomes if one were to always be honest with others.  People low in 
Agreeableness will believe that constancy in behavior is good no matter what the 
situation demands and will thus see the consequence of always being honest as positive 
(e.g., you get to be true to yourself when you are always honest).  Those high in 
Agreeableness, on the other hand, believe that people should adapt their behavior to the 
situation and thus see the consequence of always being honest as negative (e.g., it might 
offend other people if you are honest about a person’s disheveled look).  This process 
led to the final item, seen in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Example Conditional Reasoning Item for Agreeableness
 
Generally, honesty is considered to be a good quality to possess.  People deserve to hear 
the truth because it affects the way they make decisions and the way they behave.  Even 
though there may be times when it is difficult to be honest with people because it hurts 
their feelings, it is usually a good idea to be honest all the time. 
Based on the previous statements, which of the following do you think will occur as a 
result of always being honest? 
 
a) People will be able to develop trust and credibility with others. (A-) 
b) People will be less likely to encounter new situations. 
c) People will often be unpopular with other people. (A+) 
d) People will be able to identify their own shortcomings.  
 
Note. For this item, option A represents the low Agreeableness option and option C 
represents the high Agreeableness item; the other two options are illogical.   
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In order to generate items, it was also necessary to learn some basic principles of 
logic in order to ensure the inductive reasoning quality of the items.  The author of the 
test checked the items for proper argument form (e.g., modus ponens and modus tollens), 
logical fallacies, rules of inference, and methods of agreement based on mathematical 
and philosophical logics (Bell, DeVidi, & Solomon, 2001; Hurley, 2008).  Specifically, 
the modus ponens argument form determines consequences based a set of antecedent 
parameters, such as “If a psychology student graduated, then the student must have taken 
a statistics course.  Molly is a psychology student who graduated; therefore, she must 
have taken a statistics course.”  The modus tollens is similar to the modus ponens but 
determines a consequence based on a negative argument: “If it is Tuesday, then you have 
yoga class.  You do not have yoga class, therefore it is not Tuesday.”  The investigation 
into classical logic texts combined with the item revision process mentioned below 
strengthened the illogical nature of the distractor items (similar to techniques used by 
James, 1998).  
Following item generation, graduate students and faculty members reviewed the 
18 Agreeableness items and 15 Extraversion items.  All graduate students who reviewed 
items were familiar with the concept of CRTs due to their participation in a graduate-
level class in individual differences.  A total of five people reviewed the Agreeableness 
items and a total of four people reviewed the Extraversion items.  Reviewers provided 
feedback on grammatical and typographical errors in the items, readability and 
understandability of the items for a typical undergraduate student, the ability of the item 
to measure the personality trait being assessed, contamination of the item by other 
 68 
 
constructs, and the appropriateness of the illogical options.  The existing CRT items 
were edited based on reviewer feedback.   
Experimental Conditions 
 The 2 x 2 within-subjects portion of the study was manipulated by having 
respondents complete both the traditional, Likert-type personality measure and the CRT 
for both Agreeableness and Extraversion constructs.  Depending on experimental 
condition, the participants responded either under honest or “fake good” conditions with 
either the true purpose of the test revealed or the true purpose kept hidden.  Participants 
were given a target for faking good, a sales job that required the test taker to possess 
construct-relevant characteristics (see instruction sets below).  These between-subjects 
conditions were manipulated using different instruction sets.  Instructions for the 
experimental manipulations related to faking were derived from a similar study 
investigating the effects of response instructions on faking situational judgment tests 
(Nguyen, Biderman, & McDaniel, 2005).  In addition, half of the participants were told 
the true purpose of the tests (i.e., measuring personality) and half of the participants were 
not told the true purpose of the test.  This methodology has been utilized in other faking 
studies (e.g., LeBreton et al., 2007).  This methodology resulted in four sets of 
instructions for each type of test (see below).  See Table 6 for sample size for each 
condition.  
Traditional Personality Test Instructions: Honest Condition, Purpose of Test Not 
Revealed: Below are phrases describing people.  Please use the rating scale 
below to describe how accurately each statement reflects you.  Describe yourself 
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as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future.  Describe yourself 
as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same 
gender as you are, and roughly your same age.  It is very important that you 
answer as honestly as possible even if you think the phrase is negative or 
unflattering.  Remember that your responses will be used for research purposes 
only and no one will have access to your responses. 
Traditional Personality Test Instructions: Fake Good Condition, Purpose of Test 
Not Revealed: Imagine that you are applying for a job as a sales representative.  
This job is very attractive to you because it is high paying.  However, people in 
this role must be social and assertive (for the Extraversion construct) or friendly 
and cooperative (for the Agreeableness construct).  You have been asked to take 
this test as part of the hiring process.  Please respond in a way that would best 
guarantee that you would get the sales representative job.   
Traditional Personality Test Instructions: Honest Condition, Purpose of Test 
Revealed: THIS IS A PERSONALITY TEST!  Below are phrases describing 
people.  Please use the rating scale below to describe how accurately each 
statement reflects you.  Although this questionnaire contains general phrases, it is 
designed to measure your personality traits.  Describe yourself as you generally 
are now, not as you wish to be in the future.  Describe yourself as you honestly 
see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same gender as you are, 
and roughly your same age.  It is very important that you answer as honestly as 
possible even if you think the phrase is negative or unflattering.  Remember that 
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your responses will be used for research purposes only and no one will have 
access to your responses. 
Traditional Personality Test Instructions: Fake Good Condition, Purpose of Test 
Revealed: THIS IS A PERSONALITY TEST!  Imagine that you are applying for 
a job as a sales representative.  This job is very attractive to you because it is 
high paying.  However, people in this role must be social and assertive (for the 
Extraversion construct) or friendly and cooperative (for the Agreeableness 
construct).  You have been asked to take this test as part of the hiring process.   
Below are phrases describing people.  Please respond in a way that would best 
guarantee that you would get the sales representative job.  Use the rating scale 
below to describe how each statement would reflect a successful sales 
representative.  Although this questionnaire contains general phrases, it is 
designed to measure your personality traits. 
Conditional Reasoning Test Instructions: Honest Condition, Purpose of Test Not 
Revealed: For each of the following questions, read the passage carefully then 
choose the option that best answers the given question.  It is very important that 
you answer as honestly as possible even if you think the answer is negative or 
unflattering.  Remember that your responses will be used for research purposes 
only and no one will have access to your responses. 
Conditional Reasoning Test Instructions: Fake Good Condition, Purpose of Test 
Not Revealed: Imagine that you are applying for a job as a sales representative.  
This job is very attractive to you because it is high paying.  However, people in 
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this role must be friendly and cooperative (Agreeableness instructions) or social 
and assertive (Extraversion instructions).  You have been asked to take this test 
as part of the hiring process.  Please respond in a way that would best guarantee 
that you would get the sales representative job. 
Conditional Reasoning Test Instructions: Honest Condition, Purpose of Test 
Revealed: THIS IS A PERSONALITY TEST NOT A LOGICAL REASONING 
TEST!  For each of the following questions, read the passage carefully then 
choose the option that best answers the given question.  Although this 
questionnaire appears to be a logical reasoning test, it is actually designed to 
measure your personality traits.  It is very important that you answer as honestly 
as possible even if you think the phrase is negative or unflattering.  Remember 
that your responses will be used for research purposes only and no one will have 
access to your responses. 
Conditional Reasoning Test Instructions: Fake Good Condition, Purpose of Test 
Revealed: THIS IS A PERSONALITY TEST NOT A LOGICAL REASONING 
TEST!  Imagine that you are applying for a job as a sales representative.  This 
job is very attractive to you because it is high paying.  However, people in this 
role must be social and assertive (for the Extraversion construct) or friendly and 
cooperative (for the Agreeableness construct).  You have been asked to take this 
test as part of the hiring process.  Please respond in a way that would best 
guarantee that you would get the sales representative job. 
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For each of the following questions, read the passage carefully then choose the 
option that best answers the given question.  Although this questionnaire appears 
to be a logical reasoning test, it is actually designed to measure your personality 
traits. 
Manipulation Check 
Two items were created to ensure that participants were cognizant of the study 
instructions.  In the first item, participants were asked how they responded to the 
previous questionnaires.  Response options were: (1) I responded honestly to all tests, (2) 
I responded in a desirable way to all tests, (3) I responded randomly to all tests, and (4) I 
responded both honestly and in a desirable way, depending on instructions.  The second 
item asked what the tests were designed to measure.  Response options were: (1) All 
questionnaires measured personality, (2) Some questionnaires measured personality 
while some measure logical reasoning, and (3) All questionnaires measured logical 
reasoning.   
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Table 6 
Sample Size by Condition 
 N Type of Test Construct Purpose Faking 
Group 1 12 Traditional/CRT Agreeableness/ 
Extraversion 
Not 
Revealed 
Honest 
Group 2 11 Traditional/CRT Extraversion/ 
Agreeableness 
Not 
Revealed 
Honest 
Group 3 11 CRT/Traditional Agreeableness/ 
Extraversion 
Not 
Revealed 
Honest 
Group 4 11 CRT/Traditional Extraversion/ 
Agreeableness 
Not 
Revealed 
Honest 
Group 5 11 Traditional/CRT Agreeableness/ 
Extraversion 
Revealed Honest 
Group 6 11 Traditional/CRT Extraversion/ 
Agreeableness 
Revealed Honest 
Group 7 12 CRT/Traditional Agreeableness/ 
Extraversion 
Revealed Honest 
Group 8 12 CRT/Traditional Extraversion/ 
Agreeableness 
Revealed Honest 
Group 9 13 Traditional/CRT Agreeableness/ 
Extraversion 
Not 
Revealed 
Fake Good 
Group 10 13 Traditional/CRT Extraversion/ 
Agreeableness 
Not 
Revealed 
Fake Good 
Group 11 13 CRT/Traditional Agreeableness/ 
Extraversion 
Not 
Revealed 
Fake Good 
Group 12 11 CRT/Traditional Extraversion/ 
Agreeableness 
Not 
Revealed 
Fake Good 
Group 13 11 Traditional/CRT Agreeableness/ 
Extraversion 
Revealed Fake Good 
Group 14 12 Traditional/CRT Extraversion/ 
Agreeableness 
Revealed Fake Good 
Group 15 12 CRT/Traditional Agreeableness/ 
Extraversion 
Revealed Fake Good 
Group 16 11 CRT/Traditional Extraversion/ 
Agreeableness 
Revealed Fake Good 
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Preference for Tests 
 Participants completed three items designed to assess their attitudes towards the 
two different types of tests presented in the study.  Participants were asked which type of 
test they would most prefer to take if applying for a job, which type of test would be 
most fair in a selection context, and which would be most accurate in a selection context.  
Although not directly related to the hypotheses of the current study, these items are 
important in determining applicant preferences for the CRT compared to more 
traditional personality tests. 
Validation Measures 
 Several criteria measures were included as part of the study in order to determine 
the construct-related and criterion-related validity of the CRTs and to compare the 
validity of these tests to traditional personality tests used in practice.   
Interpersonal conflict. Interpersonal conflict has been found to be negatively 
related to Agreeableness (Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 1996).  In order to assess 
interpersonal conflict as evidence of construct-related validity, participants completed a 
four-item measure (Spector & Jex, 1998; α = .74).  Participants rated the frequency of 
experiences such as “How often do you get into arguments with others?” on a five-point 
scale from Never to Very Often.  Internal consistency reliability for this measure in the 
current study was .85. 
Empathy. A five-item Empathy measure was administered to provide evidence 
of the construct validity of the Agreeableness CRT.  The current study used the 
Sympathy Tendency subscale of Mehrabian and Epstein’s (1972) 33-item measure of 
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empathy.  Previous research has found that sympathy is related to Agreeableness 
(Graziano et al., 2007).  Other subscales of this measure such as “Willingness to be in 
Contact with Others Who Have Problems” and “Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion” 
were omitted due to the weaker expected relationships to Agreeableness and due to time 
constraints.  Participants indicated their agreement on a five-point scale with several 
statements, including, “It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group” and “I really 
get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.”  Internal consistency 
reliability for this five-item measure in this study was .39.  The Empathy scale reliability 
is surprising, but may be lower due to the fact that only a subset of items were 
administered to participants.  Past research on the scale indicated that the full scale 
reliability was sufficient (split-half reliability = .84; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972).  
However, reliabilities of the subscales were not reported and may be lower than the 
overall scale. 
Positive and negative affect. As mentioned in the introduction, people high in 
Extraversion tend to have a higher positive affect than those low in Extraversion 
(Watson & Clark, 1997; Wilt & Revelle, 2009).  Watson, Clark, and Tellegen’s (1988) 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) was administered to participants.  This 
widely-used scale consists of 20 items and asks participants to indicate the extent to 
which they generally feel certain emotions.  Participants rated words such as “Irritable” 
or “Alert” on a five-point scale ranging from Very Slightly or Not at All to Extremely.  
Internal consistency reliability for this measure in the current study was .86. 
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Volunteerism. Participants completed four items from Clary et al.’s (1998) 30-
item Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI).  Volunteerism attitudes and behaviors have 
been found to be related to the altruism component of Agreeableness (Clary et al., 1998; 
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972).  The four items used in the current study were taken from 
the Values subscale of the VFI.  Participants rated nine statements on a five-point Likert 
scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree).  Example items include, “I plan to 
participate in volunteer activities” and “I feel compassion toward people in need.” 
Internal consistency reliability for this measure in the current study was .86. 
Team player inventory. In order to assess teamwork, participants completed a 
measure created and validated by Kline (1999).  Participants indicated the extent to 
which they agreed with ten statements including, “I enjoy working on team/group 
projects” and “My own work is enhanced when I am in a group/team situation.”  Internal 
consistency for this measure in the current study is .84. 
Friendships. Participants were also asked about the number of friendships they 
have and interactions with others.  It is expected that high rather than low levels of 
Extraversion would be positively related to a large number of close and peripheral 
friends, new friends, and greater frequencies of face-to-face and technology-mediated 
interactions.  The five items (developed for the current study) related to friendships 
were: 
1.   How many close friends do you have? 
2.   How many peripheral (non-close) friendships do you have? 
3.   How many new friends have you made in the past year? 
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4.   How many hours during the average day do you spend interacting with friends in 
person? 
5.   How many hours during the average day do you spend with friends through 
technology (e.g., Facebook, texting, chat)? 
Organizations and leadership. Participants were asked to indicate the number 
and level of involvement in both service and social organizations.  Participants were also 
asked if they had any leadership experience within these organizations.  It is expected 
that individuals high in Extraversion will become more involved with organizations in 
order to engage in social interactions.  In addition, those high in Extraversion will likely 
seek out leadership positions as a means to have greater influence over others.  Items 
were generated for the current study and consisted of: 
1. How many service clubs or organizations are you a part of? 
2. On average, what is your level of involvement within these service 
organizations? 
3. Do you hold a leadership position in any these service organizations? 
4. Would you like to hold a leadership position in these service organizations? 
5. How many social clubs or organizations are you a part of? 
6. What is your level of involvement within these social organizations? 
7. Do you hold a leadership position in any of these social organizations? 
8. Would you like to hold a leadership position in these social organizations? 
Work experience and job performance. Consistent with the literature, it was 
expected that job performance would be positively related to both Agreeableness and 
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Extraversion (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hough & Furnham, 2003).  Participants 
were first asked about their work history (i.e., Do you currently have a job, How many 
hours do you work at this job per week, and If you don’t currently work, how long ago 
were you in your last job?).  Then participants indicated their job performance on their 
current or most previous job using three performance items from Williams and Anderson 
(1991).  Participants rated their level of agreement with statements including, “I perform 
tasks that are expected of me” and “I fulfill responsibilities specified in job description.”  
In addition, participants indicated their job performance overall and on several 
personality-congruent work behaviors because personality-congruent behaviors have 
been found to be more highly related to personality constructs (Barrick & Mount, 1991).  
The measure used for the current study consisted of the following items and had an 
internal consistency of .93 for the current study:  
1. My overall job performance is good. 
2. I am able to successfully complete aspects of my job that require me to be 
outgoing. 
3. I am able to successfully complete aspects of my job that require me to be social 
with people I do not know well. 
4. I am able to successfully complete aspects of my job that require me to be 
assertive. 
5. I am able to successfully complete aspects of my job that require me to be 
friendly to others. 
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6. I am able to successfully complete aspects of my job that require me to treat 
others with dignity. 
7. I am able to successfully complete aspects of my job that require me to 
empathize with others. 
General and open-ended items. Participants were asked several open-ended 
items designed to tap into Agreeableness and Extraversion.  The responses were then 
content-analyzed on a five-point scale ranging from Very Low Agreeableness (or 
Extraversion) to Very High Agreeableness (or Extraversion).  Participant responses that 
were unrelated to Agreeableness or Extraversion were not rated.  The open-ended items 
were: 
1. Describe your idea of a perfect Friday night. (Extraversion) 
2. Describe how you make friends with others. (Extraversion) 
3. Describe how you interact with people you don’t know. (Extraversion) 
4. Describe how you achieve what you want when working as part of a team. 
(Agreeableness) 
5. Describe how you would react if someone tried to get you to do something you 
didn’t want to do. (Agreeableness) 
6. When making decisions with others, do you prefer to stick to your own beliefs or 
try to reach a compromise? (Agreeableness) 
Except for item six which is a dichotomous item, the researcher’s judgment was used to 
code the open-ended responses into a five-point scale.  Although ideally responses 
would have been coded by more than one rater, precautions were taken to ensure as 
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accurate coding as possible.  The author created a priori critical incidents for each of the 
items in order to score the open-ended responses.  For example, the scale used with the 
item, “Describe your idea of a perfect Friday night” was: 
1. (Very Low Extraversion) – Staying at home and doing activities alone 
2. (Low Extraversion) – Staying at home with family or close friends 
3. (Average Extraversion) – Going out to dinner with friends or family 
4. (High Extraversion) – Going to multiple places with friends or family or 
engaging in social events (e.g., dancing) with friends or family 
5. (Very High Extraversion) – Going out to a dance club or party to meet new 
people 
Standardized internal consistency reliability for the three Extraversion items was .55 
and standardized internal consistency reliability was .46 for the three Agreeableness 
items.  Although these reliabilities are low compared to general statistical conventions, 
it is believed that these items are diverse and are tapping into different aspects of the 
constructs.   
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CHAPTER IX 
RESULTS 
 
Counterbalancing 
 As mentioned in the method section, both the type of test (traditional personality 
or CRT) and the construct being measured (Agreeableness or Extraversion) were 
counterbalanced.  To determine whether there were order effects, variables were 
analyzed using a one-way ANOVA.  For the fake good, purpose of test not revealed 
(FG-NR) condition, no significant mean differences were found for mean scores on the 
NEO-E, F(3, 41) = 1.88, p = .15, η2 = .12, NEO-A, F(3, 41) = 1.34, p =.27, η2 = .09, or 
the CRT-E, F(3, 41) = .1.85, p =.15, η2 = .12.  Significant differences were found for 
scores on the CRT-A, F(3, 41) = .3.05, p =.04, η2 = .18.  Because sample sizes are 
relatively equal and multiple comparisons are being made, Tukey’s HSD is an 
appropriate statistical test for post hoc comparisons.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s 
Honest Significant Difference test (HSD) indicated significant differences in CRT-A 
means when the order of tests was CRT-E, CRT-A, NEO-E, and NEO-A (M = 1.73, SD 
= 4.92) than when the order of tests was NEO-E, NEO-A, CRT-E, CRT-A (M = 6.25, 
SD = 3.00).  No other significant differences were found for any other comparisons.  For 
the fake good, purpose of test revealed condition (FG-R), mean scores on the NEO-E, 
F(3, 42) = 1.13, p = .35, η2 = .08, the NEO-A, F(3, 42) = 1.56, p = .21, η2 = .10, the 
CRT-E, F(3, 42) = .15, p = .93, η2 = .01, and CRT-A, F(3, 42) = .29, p = .83, η2 = .02 
were all nonsignificant, indicating that there were no differences in mean scores on any 
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of the tests due to presentation of tests for the fake good, purpose of test revealed 
conditions.  For the honest, purpose of test not revealed condition (H-NR), an ANOVA 
revealed no significant differences for the NEO-E, F(3, 46) = 1.35, p = .27, η2 = .08, 
NEO-A, F(3, 46) = .53, p = .67, η2 = .03, or the CRT-E, F(3, 46) = .24, p = .87, η2 = .02.  
There was a significant difference for the CRT-A, F(3, 46) = 2.87, p = .047, η2 = .16.  
Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s Honest Significant Difference test (HSD) indicated 
significant differences in CRT-A means when the order of tests was CRT-E, CRT-A, 
NEO-E, and NEO-A (M = 1.69, SD = 3.57) than when the order of tests was CRT-A, 
CRT-E, NEO-A, NEO-E (M = 6.27, SD = 3.58).  No other significant differences were 
found for any other comparisons.  Lastly, the honest, purpose of test revealed condition 
(H-R) indicated no significant differences in mean scores for the NEO-E, F(3, 42) = .60, 
p = .62, η2 = .04, NEO-A, F(3, 42) = .57, p = .64, η2 = .04, CRT-E, F(3, 42) = 1.25, p = 
.30, η2 = .08, or CRT-A, F(3, 42) = .09, p = .97, η2 = .01.   
It is theoretically unknown why there would be differences for some (but not 
most) of the test presentation schemes.  The only mean scores that were effected were 
for the CRT-A under both fake good and honest conditions when the purpose of the test 
was not revealed.  It is unknown exactly why this order effect exists.  Because means on 
the CRT-A were higher when the CRT was presented last, it may be the case that people 
simply become better at differentiating between the justification mechanism-congruent 
options and are then better at selecting the Agreeable option.  The effect sizes for the 
order effects are relatively small, however.  Given the relatively small sample sizes for 
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each condition, it is argued that these effects are not so troublesome as to negate the 
current study results. 
Manipulation Check 
For the faking manipulation check, 7.7% of participants in the fake good 
condition correctly identified their experimental condition and 44.0% of participants 
indicated that they responded both honestly and in a desirable manner.  However, 48.4% 
indicated that they responded honestly instead of faking.  Results show that 82.3% of 
participants in the honest condition correctly identified their experimental condition and 
11.5% of participants indicated that they responded both honestly and in a desirable 
manner.  Several test takers (5.2%) indicated that they were in the fake good condition 
instead of the honest condition.   
The high number of participants incorrectly identifying their experimental 
condition could be an indicator that participants did not fully comprehend the survey 
instructions.  However, the placement of the manipulation check items in the survey may 
have created confusion about which questionnaires the researcher was referencing.  The 
manipulation check items followed questions about demographics and face validity in 
addition to the NEO and CRT items.  Participants may have been indicating that they 
responded honestly to the demographic and/or face validity items in an honest manner 
even though they were part of the fake good condition.  Also, the term “socially 
desirable” may have been confusing for participants.  For example, someone who 
responded honestly on the Agreeableness personality tests but who is, in fact, highly 
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Agreeable is likely to say that they are responding honestly and in a socially desirable 
way (given that high Agreeableness is seen as a socially desirable trait).   
The manipulation check for the purpose of the test condition showed that 48.9% 
of participants who had the purpose of the test revealed to them correctly identified their 
experimental condition (that all test measured personality) and 3.3% indicated that all 
questionnaires measured logical reasoning.  In addition, 47.8% of participants indicated 
that some questionnaires measured personality while some measured logical reasoning.  
For participants who did not have the purpose of the test revealed to them, 87.4% of 
participants indicated that some tests measured personality while others measured 
logical reasoning (which should be the case if the purpose of the test is not revealed).  
Three percent of participants indicated that all the questionnaires measured logical 
reasoning and 9.5% of participants indicated that all the questionnaires measured 
personality.   
The large percentage of participants indicating that some tests measured logical 
reasoning and some measured personality when the instructions indicated that they all 
measured personality may be an indicator of the pervasiveness of the logical reasoning 
test format of the CRT.  It may be that participants continued to believe that the CRTs 
were measuring logical reasoning because they are designed to have the look and feel of 
such tests.  Also, because of the placement of the manipulation check items, participants 
may have been confused about which questionnaires the researcher was referring to, 
similar to the fake good condition mentioned above.  Lastly, participants may have been 
wary of the questions particularly because they were aware of the fact it was part of a 
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psychological study.  The seemingly obvious layout of the CRT as a logical reasoning 
test as compared to a personality test may have overridden the instruction set which said 
that it was indeed a personality test.  It may be that test takers were suspicious of the 
instructions, did not want to seem as though they had been deceived in any way, and 
therefore did not heed the true experimental instructions.   
Given these ambiguous results, an ANOVA was conducted to determine if mean 
scores on the traditional personality tests were actually higher when participants were 
instructed to fake.  Given that previous research has found that individuals are able to 
fake when instructed to do so (Hough et al., 1990; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), 
increases in scores on the personality tests for participants in the fake good condition 
should indicate whether or not participants followed the instructions.  Results indicate 
that both the NEO-E and the NEO-A scores were higher in the faking condition 
compared to the honest condition, F(1, 186) = 36.41, p = .00, η2 = .16 and F(1, 186) = 
36.39, p = .00, η2 = .16, respectively.  These results give support to the conclusion that 
the manipulation check was successful.  In hindsight, a better manipulation check would 
have specifically asked test takers whether or not they were instructed to fake good on 
the tests or whether or not the purpose of the test was revealed to them.  By collecting 
these types of data, the researcher would be able to ascertain whether or not test takers 
understood and complied with the experimental instructions.  The results of the 
manipulation check are mixed and the data call into question the veracity of the findings.  
However, because of the many possible alternative explanations or interpretations of the 
data, analyses for the main research questions of the current study will be presented. 
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Face Validity 
 Three items were administered as part of the study to determine participants’ 
attitudes and preferences for taking traditional personality tests compared to CRTs.  The 
first item assessed which type of test participants would prefer to take if they were 
applying for a job.  Participants indicated they would prefer to take the NEO-PI-R 
(59.4%) over the CRT (40.6%).  However, when asked which type of test would be most 
fair in identifying high performing job applicants, participants selected the CRT (58.8%) 
over the NEO-PI-R (24.1%).  Participants also indicated that they believed the CRT 
(60.4%) would be more accurate at identifying high-performing job applicants than the 
NEO-PI-R (23.5%). 
Illogical Responses 
 According to James et al. (2005), most respondents of the Aggression CRT 
choose options related to justification mechanisms instead of the illogical options.  
Tables 7-10 show the number of participants selecting either of the illogical response 
options for each CRT item.  Many of the items for Agreeableness and Extraversion 
CRTs were at or below 10% choosing illogical options.  Extraversion item 12 and 
Agreeableness item 18 have a high percentage of people (30% or greater) choosing 
illogical options.  Although the logicality of CRT response options were vetted during 
the item development stage, items with a high percentage of illogical responses chosen 
likely indicate poor items.  
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Table 7 
CRT_FG_NR: Illogical Responses Chosen by Participants 
Extraversion 
Item N % 
Agreeableness 
Item N % 
1 9 20.0 1 12 26.7 
2 3 6.7 2 7 15.6 
3 10 22.2 3 1 2.2 
4 8 17.8 4 7 15.6 
5 2 4.4 5 5 11.1 
6 7 15.6 6 3 6.7 
7 4 8.9 7 1 2.2 
8 4 8.9 8 3 6.7 
9 2 4.4 9 6 13.3 
10 9 20.0 10 3 6.7 
11 0 0.0 11 5 11.1 
12 15 33.3 12 2 4.4 
13 7 15.6 13 7 15.6 
14 5 11.1 14 3 6.7 
15 1 2.2 15 9 20.0 
   16 4 8.9 
   17 4 8.9 
   18 11 24.4 
Note. CRT = Conditional reasoning test, FG = Fake good condition, NR = Purpose of 
test not revealed condition. N = 45. Items with 30% or higher responding illogically are 
highlighted in gray. 
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Table 8 
CRT_FG_R: Illogical Responses Chosen by Participants 
Extraversion 
Item N % 
Agreeableness 
Item N % 
1 5 10.9 1 7 15.2 
2 7 15.2 2 8 17.4 
3 8 17.4 3 4 8.7 
4 11 23.9 4 8 17.4 
5 2 4.3 5 5 10.9 
6 9 19.6 6 0 0.0 
7 3 6.5 7 1 2.2 
8 3 6.5 8 5 10.9 
9 3 6.5 9 0 0.0 
10 11 23.9 10 2 4.3 
11 5 10.9 11 4 8.7 
12 15 32.6 12 3 6.5 
13 11 23.9 13 5 10.9 
14 4 8.9 14 1 2.2 
15 7 15.2 15 9 19.6 
   16 3 6.5 
   17 7 15.2 
   18 16 34.8 
Note. CRT = Conditional reasoning test, FG = Fake good condition, R = Purpose of test 
revealed condition. N = 46. Items with 30% or higher responding illogically are 
highlighted in gray.
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Table 9 
CRT_H_NR: Illogical Responses Chosen by Participants 
Extraversion 
Item N % 
Agreeableness 
Item N % 
1 4 8.0 1 4 8.0 
2 8 16.0 2 13 26.0 
3 12 24.0 3 4 8.0 
4 9 18.0 4 7 14.0 
5 3 6.0 5 8 16.0 
6 8 16.0 6 1 2.0 
7 2 4.0 7 6 12.0 
8 1 2.0 8 3 6.0 
9 7 14.0 9 1 2.0 
10 12 24.0 10 3 6.0 
11 3 6.0 11 9 18.0 
12 18 36.0 12 6 12.0 
13 11 22.0 13 10 20.0 
14 4 8.0 14 4 8.0 
15 5 10.0 15 6 12.0 
   16 6 12.0 
   17 8 16.0 
   18 17 34.0 
Note. CRT = Conditional reasoning test, H = Honest condition, NR = Purpose of test not 
revealed condition. N = 50. Items with 30% or higher responding illogically are 
highlighted in gray. 
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Table 10 
CRT_H_R: Illogical Responses Chosen by Participants 
Extraversion 
Item N % 
Agreeableness 
Item N % 
1 4 8.7 1 8 17.4 
2 6 13.0 2 10 21.7 
3 9 19.6 3 6 13.0 
4 9 19.6 4 7 15.2 
5 5 10.9 5 7 15.2 
6 5 10.9 6 3 6.5 
7 1 2.2 7 9 19.6 
8 2 4.3 8 6 13.0 
9 4 8.7 9 3 6.5 
10 8 17.4 10 3 6.5 
11 8 17.4 11 6 13.0 
12 15 32.6 12 7 15.2 
13 11 24.4 13 8 17.4 
14 5 11.1 14 3 6.5 
15 4 8.7 15 5 10.9 
   16 4 8.7 
   17 5 10.9 
   18 8 17.4 
Note. CRT = Conditional reasoning test, H = Honest condition, R = Purpose of test 
revealed condition. N = 46. Items with 30% or higher responding illogically are 
highlighted in gray. 
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Tests of Hypotheses 
Validity results. In order to assess the utility of the conditional reasoning tests 
created with the traditional NEO personality assessment, correlations between scores on 
the test and the relevant outcome variables were conducted and analyzed.  See Table 11 
for correlations and scale reliabilities.   
Correlations.  Hypothesis 1 stated that traditional, self-report personality tests 
for Agreeableness and Extraversion would be positively correlated to construct-relevant 
criteria and Hypothesis 2 stated that CRTs for Agreeableness and Extraversion would be 
positively correlated to construct-relevant criteria.  
 The NEO-PI-R tests tend to significantly correlate with more of the relevant 
criteria than the CRTs and the NEO-PI-R correlations tend to be of greater magnitude 
than the CRT correlations.  For example, the NEO-A-H-R significantly correlated with 
the open-ended Agreeableness questions (ZGQ_A; r = .58, p < .01), the number of 
people they have as close friends (r = .30, p < .05), the number of people who they feel 
call them a close friend (r = .29, p < .05), volunteer behaviors (r = .50, p < .01), and 
interpersonal conflict.  The CRT-A-H-R only significantly correlated in an expected 
manner with interpersonal conflict (r = -.34, p < .05).  There are a few instances where 
the CRTs were significantly correlated with relevant criteria, but opposite of 
expectations (e.g., correlation between CRT-E-H-NR and number of people calling the 
participant a close friend, r = -.32, p < .05).  These opposite correlations are more 
prevalent in the faking conditions for the CRT (e.g., correlation between CRT-A-FG-R 
and number of close friends, r = -.34, p < .05).  Upon analysis of the data, it was 
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determined that small sample sizes (N = 11-13) were driving the unexpected 
correlations.   
It is also important to examine the correlations between the tests and relevant 
criteria for the honest versus fake good conditions.  These results provide insight into the 
effect of faking on criterion-related validity.  Overall, the NEO tests tend to significantly 
correlate with more relevant criteria under the honest conditions compared to the fake 
good conditions (e.g., the many significant correlations for the NEO-A-H-R) and these 
correlations tend to be of equal or higher magnitude than the fake good conditions (e.g., 
NEO-A and the open-ended general Agreeableness item 3 for the purpose of the test not 
revealed condition, honest r = .34, p < .05, fake good r = .31, p < .05).  A similar trend is 
found in the correlations between the CRTs and relevant outcomes (e.g., CRT-A and 
interpersonal conflict for the purpose of the test revealed condition, honest r = -.34, p < 
.05, fake good r = -.26, p > .05).   
Correlations between the CRT and NEO tests can indicate construct-related 
validity evidence (i.e., mutitrait-multimethod matrix; Campbell & Fiske, 1959).  Results 
show that, similar to other research on CRTs, the correlations between CRTs and the 
NEO-PI-R tests for the same experimental conditions are predominantly nonsignificant 
or low.  These results are consistent with previous research on CRTs.  James (1998) 
argues that the lack of significant correlations between CRTs and other personality tests 
of the same constructs is due to the CRT tapping into subconscious aspects of 
personality. 
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Based on the findings of this study, the CRTs are not a particularly valid measure 
of Agreeableness and Extraversion and the traditional, self-report measure is much better 
at predicting relevant outcomes.  When analyzing differences between faking conditions 
and honest conditions for both types of tests, there appears to be a greater number of 
significant correlations and correlations of higher magnitudes for the honest NEO-PI-R 
tests compared to the fake good NEO-PI-R tests; there does not appear to be a large 
difference between fake good and honest responding for the CRTs.  It should be noted 
that traditional test development techniques such as analysis of inter-item correlations, 
factor analysis, or empirical keying will likely increase criterion-related validity.  The 
CRTs developed for this study are in the infancy of their development and exploratory in 
terms of criterion-related validity.  Future research should investigate the prospect of 
adding or removing items to improve these results. 
Although this study did not specifically investigate demographic variables, the 
correlations for sex and age and the variables of interest were analyzed.  Sex was found 
to be significantly correlated with the NEO-E-FG-NR (r = .31, p < .05) such that women 
were more likely to have higher scores than men when the test instructions are to fake 
good on the test and when the purpose of the test is not revealed.  These findings suggest 
that there may be sex differences in the ability to fake the traditional personality test.  
Research with respect to sex has found mixed results.  Ones and Viswesvaran (1998) 
found higher scores for males than females on social desirability scales.  However, 
Graham et al. (1994) found that females self-reported higher levels of cheating than men.  
Age was found to be related to the NEO-A-FG-R (r = .35, p < .05 such that older 
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individuals had higher scores on the traditional Agreeableness test than younger 
individuals when the instructions for the test were as obvious as possible (fake good, 
purpose of the test revealed).  Ones and Viswesvaran (1998) found that older individuals 
score somewhat higher on social desirability scales than younger individuals (corrected d 
= .12).  Future research may further want to investigate differences in responding 
between age and sex, particularly if CRTs are used in selection contexts. 
It is also important to note that participant educational level was only 
significantly related to the CRT-A-FG-R (r = .30, p<.05) and that reading ability was 
significantly negatively related to the NEO-E-FG-NR (r = -.38, p<.05) and the NEO-A-
H-R (r = -.30, p<.05).  Past research has shown that education is an acceptable, though 
not optimal, proxy for cognitive ability (Berry, Gruys, & Sackett, 2006).  Although one 
might expect CRTs to be related to cognitive ability because of the higher reading 
demands placed on test takers, studies using the Aggression CRT find nonsignificant 
correlations with cognitive ability (James et al., 2005; LeBreton et al., 2007).  The 
correlation between educational level and the CRT-A-FG-R was the only significant 
correlation across all CRT experimental conditions (and the criterion of English literacy 
and reading ability) and no patterns can be detected.  These findings indicate that the 
CRTs have little relationship with cognitive ability, consistent with other CRT research.  
Future research should directly test this claim, using an actual measure of cognitive 
ability, however.  The negative correlations for reading ability and the NEO-E-FG-NR 
and NEO-A-H-R are somewhat surprising.  It is unclear why these findings may be 
present, however, it should be mentioned that the variance in the reading ability variable 
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(σ2 = .14) is relatively low which is likely restricting the range of that variable.  
Restriction of range reduces the magnitude of correlations in the sample compared to the 
population.  
Reliabilities for the scales are presented in the diagonal of Table 11.  The internal 
consistency reliabilities of the CRTs were low across many of the instruction sets and 
constructs (α = .05-.30) and the reliability for the CRT-E-H-R was negative (α = -.07) 
even after ensuring that items were coded correctly.  Cronbach and Hartmann (1954) 
state that in the case of negative internal consistency coefficients, a typical interpretation 
is there is zero internal consistency of the test.  Although internal consistency 
reliabilities have been presented in previous CRT literature, researchers argue that 
because CRTs are multidimensional, internal consistency is likely not the appropriate 
measure of reliability (James, 1998; LeBreton et al., 2007).  Responses to CRT items 
may be based on any number of unique combinations of JM endorsement; not every 
participant may subscribe to all justification mechanisms (i.e., endorsing some JMs but 
not others).  Therefore, other forms of reliability, such as factorial or test-retest may be 
better forms.  In order to obtain high coefficient alpha, CRTs would need to be 
administered using many items to test each justification mechanism.  Given the lengthy 
amount of time it takes participants to complete CRT items and the number of JMs 
identified for Extraversion and Agreeableness in this study (7 and 6, respectively), tests 
would take hours to complete.   
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Table 11 
Statistics for Study Variables 
  
N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Sex 186 1.58 .50 -- 
        2. Age 187 48.32 13.01 -.01 -- 
       
3. 
Educational  
Level 187 4.80 1.71 -.13 -.20** -- 
      
4. 
English  
Literacy 187 1.05 .22 .02 .04 .13 -- 
     
5. 
Reading  
Ability 187 1.08 .37 .04 .10 -.17* -.05 -- 
    6. NEO_E_FG_NR 45 4.07 .79 .31* -.23 .10 -.07 -.38** .91 
   7. NEO_A_FG_NR 45 4.39 .62 .21 -.08 -.09 -.15 -.19 .53** .90 
  8. NEO_E_FG_R 46 4.12 .83 .13 .06 .09 .08 -.17 -- -- .93 
 9. NEO_A_FG_R 46 4.43 .57 .20 .35* -.03 .09 -.14 -- -- .79** .88 
10. NEO_E_H_NR 50 3.13 .83 -.08 .04 .09 -.07 -.14 -- -- -- -- 
11. NEO_A_H_NR 50 3.90 .61 -.16 .13 -.04 -.14 .04 -- -- -- -- 
12. NEO_E_H_R 46 3.57 .82 -.11 .15 .09 .02 .04 -- -- -- -- 
13. NEO_A_H_R 46 3.84 .64 .14 .28 .07 .09 -.30* -- -- -- -- 
14. CRT_E_FG_NR 45 0.82 3.72 -.01 -.17 .04 .01 -.20 .29 .19 -- -- 
15. CRT_A_FG_NR 45 3.93 4.20 .13 .11 -.18 .11 .18 .29 .39** -- -- 
16. CRT_E_FG_R 46 2.28 3.47 .00 .08 .00 .00 -.06 -- -- .14 .21 
17. CRT_A_FG_R 46 4.78 3.96 .23 -.19 .30* .27 .01 -- -- .18 .24 
18. CRT_E_H_NR 50 0.38 3.35 .17 .25 -.01 -.15 .15 -- -- -- -- 
19. CRT_A_H_NR 50 3.60 4.05 .27 -.10 .05 -.27 -.06 -- -- -- -- 
20. CRT_E_H_R 46 2.04 4.00 -.10 .12 -.06 -.06 -.18 -- -- -- -- 
21. CRT_A_H_R 46 2.57 4.15 .06 .26 .13 .15 -.05 -- -- -- -- 
(table continues) 
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Table 11 Continued 
  
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1. Sex       
      2. Age       
      
3. 
Educational 
Level       
      
4. 
English  
Literacy       
      
5. 
Reading  
Ability       
      6. NEO_E_FG_NR       
      7. NEO_A_FG_NR       
      8. NEO_E_FG_R       
      9. NEO_A_FG_R       
      10. NEO_E_H_NR .88      
      11. NEO_A_H_NR .46** .81     
      12. NEO_E_H_R -- -- .89    
      13. NEO_A_H_R -- -- .32* .79   
      14. CRT_E_FG_NR -- -- -- -- .14  
      15. CRT_A_FG_NR -- -- -- -- .19 .30 
      16. CRT_E_FG_R -- -- -- -- -- -- .05 
     17. CRT_A_FG_R -- -- -- -- -- -- .19 .20 
    18. CRT_E_H_NR -.10 .12 -- -- -- -- -- -- -.07 
   19. CRT_A_H_NR -.11 -.02 -- -- -- -- -- -- .21 .22 
  20. CRT_E_H_R -- -- .25 .13 -- -- -- -- -- -- .30 
 21. CRT_A_H_R -- -- -.02 .29 -- -- -- -- -- -- .08 .23 
(table continues) 
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Table 11 Continued 
  N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
22. GQ_E1 181 2.29 1.07 -.03 .00 .15* -.02 .10 .29 .08 .04 
23. GQ_E2 180 3.04 1.11 .11 -.05 -.06 -.11 .02 .23 .33* .14 
24. GQ_E3 177 3.07 1.05 .15 .07 -.22** -.09 .00 .12 .19 .27 
25. ZGQ_E 182 .00 .73 .11 .00 -.07 -.10 .09 .30 .27 .20 
26. GQ_A1 177 3.13 1.21 -.06 -.09 -.21** -.05 -.01 -.10 .18 -.07 
27. GQ_A2 172 2.76 1.21 -.04 .01 -.13 -.05 -.09 .16 .06 -.04 
28. GQ_A3 187 1.76 .43 .11 .16* -.11 .01 -.02 -.05 .31* .05 
29. ZGQ_A 187 -.03 .74 .01 .06 -.21** -.03 -.10 -.04 .21 -.01 
30. # Friends 185 50.58 166.83 .07 -.07 .05 -.05 -.03 .20 .12 .18 
31. # Close Friends 187 5.41 7.47 .12 .09 .10 .00 -.06 .16 .15 .04 
32. # New Friends 187 4.94 9.40 .06 -.08 .03 -.08 -.06 .22 .05 .15 
33. 
# Calling You 
Friend 186 37.68 90.36 .06 -.06 .01 -.08 -.04 .36* .23 .15 
34. 
# Calling You 
Close Friend 186 5.94 7.61 .12 .04 .11 -.06 -.09 .14 .17 .15 
35. # Dislike You 179 5.82 18.93 -.10 .02 -.03 -.04 -.04 .23 -.01 .13 
36. 
# Hours Talking 
to Friends 187 2.11 2.95 -.05 -.09 -.06 .03 -.10 .31
*
 .09 -.11 
37. 
# Hours 
Technology with 
Friends 186 2.09 3.51 .06 -.18
*
 -.04 -.06 -.03 .12 .01 -.23 
38. # Orgs 187 1.80 2.06 -.02 -.08 .16* -.06 .01 .10 .07 .16 
39. Org Involvement 187 2.50 1.15 .06 -.07 .16* -.06 -.13 .11 .09 -.01 
(table continued) 
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Table 11 Continued 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
22. GQ_E1 .06 .38** .19 .16 -.10 -.03 -.13 .02 .05 -.19 -.30
*
 .18 
23. GQ_E2 .08 .19 .30* .29 .04 .16 -.01 -.10 -.11 -.06 -.13 .08 
24. GQ_E3 .15 .35* .33* .35* .33* -.02 .00 .01 -.02 .03 -.33
*
 -.06 
25. ZGQ_E .12 .41** .38** .34* .08 .03 -.07 -.04 -.03 -.10 -.34
*
 .07 
26. GQ_A1 -.11 -.18 -.03 -.11 .27 .10 .05 .10 .15 -.14 -.05 -.22 
27. GQ_A2 -.08 -.11 .10 .09 .34* -.01 .05 .24 .02 .16 .13 .03 
28. GQ_A3 .13 .09 .34* .33* .45** .00 .01 .10 -.07 .22 .04 .11 
29. ZGQ_A .00 -.09 .18 .20 .58** .04 .02 .20 .04 .11 .04 .10 
30. # Friends .07 .14 .21 .07 -.11 .20 .15 .08 .12 -.03 -.08 .20 
31. # Close Friends -.02 .52** .34* .06 .30* -.10 .05 -.16 -.35
*
 -.18 -.11 -.22 
32. # New Friends .04 .10 .14 -.03 -.26 .01 -.07 .03 .07 -.16 -.12 .11 
33. 
# Calling You 
Friend .03 .20 .18 .18 .06 .21 .19 .14 .10 -.22 .01 .16 
34. 
# Calling You 
Close Friend .00 .44** .33* .12 .29* -.07 .06 .03 -.04 -.32
*
 -.11 -.21 
35. # Dislike You -.04 .05 .04 .04 -.22 -.16 .29 -.18 -.17 -.06 .03 .20 
36. 
# Hours Talking 
to Friends -.22 .14 .21 .08 -.06 .25 .04 -.04 -.21 .08 -.05 -.11 
37. 
# Hours 
Technology with 
Friends -.41
**
 -.04 .09 -.15 -.31
*
 .29 .08 -.03 -.06 -.01 .20 -.13 
38. # Organizations .06 .23 .08 .19 .07 .03 -.45
**
 -.07 -.08 .07 -.04 -.03 
39. Org Involvement -.10 .32* .07 .22 .34* .16 -.20 -.08 -.13 -.07 .03 -.16 
(table continues)
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Table 11 Continued 
  21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
22. GQ_E1 .08 --           
23. GQ_E2 -.02 .34** --        
  24. GQ_E3 -.13 .14 .39** --       
  25. ZGQ_E -.04 .69** .79** .71** .55      
  26. GQ_A1 .01 -.01 .14 .14 .13 --     
  27. GQ_A2 -.04 -.10 -.02 .11 .00 .39** --    
  28. GQ_A3 .15 -.11 .13 .20** .08 .15 .13 --   
  29. ZGQ_A .11 -.13 .10 .22** .07 .74** .74** .66** .45  
  30. # Friends -.01 -.07 -.01 .06 -.01 .05 .01 .01 .03 -- 
  31. # Close Friends .01 .19** .16* .16* .23** .13 .00 .09 .11 .06 -- 
 32. # New Friends -.16 .00 .03 .13 .07 .06 -.04 -.02 -.03 .86** .20** -- 
33. 
# Calling You 
Friend .00 .04 .05 .15* .11 .12 .02 .09 .11 .59** .16* .59** 
34. 
# Calling You 
Close Friend -.04 .15* .18* .23** .25** .13 -.01 .11 .12 .24** .91** .37** 
35. # Dislike You .07 .01 .03 -.03 .00 -.04 .03 -.07 -.04 .20** .04 .16* 
36. 
# Hours Talking 
to Friends -.12 .02 .13 .13 .11 -.01 -.04 -.06 -.08 .08 .10 .17
*
 
37. 
# Hours 
Technology with 
Friends .01 .06 .08 .09 .10 .05 .00 -.15
*
 -.15
*
 .16
*
 .00 .26
**
 
38. # Organizations -.30
*
 .07 .04 .10 .09 -.03 .10 -.02 .02 .39** .19** .46** 
39. Org Involvement -.10 .09 .10 .14 .15* .07 .05 -.03 .04 .15* .31** .21** 
(table continues) 
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Table 11 Continued 
  33 34 35 36 37 38 
22. GQ_E1       
23. GQ_E2    
   24. GQ_E3    
   25. ZGQ_E    
   26. GQ_A1    
   27. GQ_A2    
   28. GQ_A3    
   29. ZGQ_A    
   30. # Friends    
   31. # Close Friends    
   32. # New Friends    
   
33. 
# Calling You 
Friend --   
   
34. 
# Calling You 
Close Friend .25** --  
   35. # Dislike You .08 .04 -- 
   
36. 
# Hours Talking 
to Friends .03 .11 .02 -- 
  
37. 
# Hours 
Technology with 
Friends .08 .04 -.04 .46
**
 -- 
 38. # Organizations .24** .27** .00 .43** .08 -- 
39. Org Involvement .12 .30** -.01 .31** .16* .60** 
(table continues) 
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Table 11 Continued 
  N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
40. Org 
Leadership 187 2.13 .92 -.01 -.09 .27** -.09 -.08 .06 -.10 .02 -.10 .36* 
41. Org 
Leadership 
Desires 187 1.94 1.13 -.09 -.17* .23** .01 -.08 .23 -.06 .19 .04 .28 
42. Volunteer 
Behaviors 187 4.13 .74 .13 -.03 -.05 -.14 -.16* .27 .41** .14 .07 .43** 
43. Teamwork 187 3.17 .70 .04 .03 -.05 -.05 -.03 .00 .32* -.18 -.01 .35* 
44. Interpersonal 
Conflict 187 2.08 .66 -.10 -.16* .01 .05 .19* -.03 -.40** -.35* -.52** -.30* 
45. Empathy 187 3.10 .57 .16* -.10 -.07 -.12 .02 .48** .41** .32* .17 .00 
46. PANAS 187 2.69 .52 .07 -.12 .10 .03 .07 .08 .12 -.10 -.19 .26 
47. Job 
Performance 187 6.04 .81 .15* .10 -.13 -.11 -.05 .04 .40** .25 .24 .22 
(table continues) 
  
 103 
 
Table 11 Continued 
  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
40. 
Org 
Leadership .02 .20 -.06 .09 
-
.47** -.17 -.05 -.12 -.22 -.06 -.19 .20** .10 
41. 
Org 
Leadership 
Desires -.10 .27 -.02 .23 -.30* -.24 .10 .08 -.05 -.10 -.25 .12 .04 
42. 
Volunteer 
Behaviors .56** .36* .50** .07 -.20 -.05 -.07 -.03 .24 .06 .28 -.02 .14 
43. Teamwork .47** .21 .53** .02 -.04 .11 .07 -.05 -.24 -.04 -.04 .04 .17* 
44. 
Interpersonal 
Conflict 
-
.56** -.28 
-
.60** 
-
.15 .11 -.10 -.26 -.20 .18 -.10 -.34* .00 -.03 
45. Empathy .36* .04 .20 .27 .16 -.05 .02 -.04 .22 .17 .26 .02 .06 
46. PANAS -.02 .06 -.23 .02 -.24 .07 .00 -.16 .09 -.08 -.30* .01 .09 
47. 
Job 
Performance .19 .42** .38** .16 -.15 .18 -.12 .19 .06 .21 .10 .07 .28** 
 (table continues) 
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Table 11 Continued 
  24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
40. Org Leadership .12 .19* .02 .04 -.10 -.03 .22** .22** .30** .17* .24** -.05 .34** .17* 
41. Org Leadership 
Desires .08 .11 .11 .01 -.03 .04 .13 .13 .18* .09 .13 -.11 .22** .09 
42. Volunteer 
Behaviors .21** .14 .10 .13 .28** .28** .10 .24** .12 .13 .25** -.03 .24** .08 
43. Teamwork .29** .23** .28** .20** .26** .34** .09 .25** .14 .04 .28** -.09 .24** .07 
44. Interpersonal 
Conflict -.17* -.07 -.06 -.10 -.33** -.29** -.07 -.05 -.02 -.03 -.10 .14 -.10 .31** 
45. Empathy .23** .14 .16* .20** .12 .24** .17* .06 .11 .23** .08 -.06 .19* .09 
46. PANAS -.04 .04 -.15* -.17* -.15* -.26** .04 .09 .11 .00 .09 .04 .08 .26** 
47. Job 
Performance .28** .28** .16* .04 .30** .26** .11 .13 .14 .16* .16* .01 .18* .10 
(table continues) 
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Table 11 Continued 
  38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 
40. Org Leadership .72** .77** --      
  
41. 
Org Leadership 
Desires .51** .50** .72** --     
  42. Volunteer Behaviors .26** .41** .34** .26** .86    
  43. Teamwork .15* .23** .16* .15* .39** .84   
  44. Interpersonal Conflict .01 .04 .11 .08 -.22** -.28** .85  
  45. Empathy .10 .16* .08 .06 .43** .19** -.21** .39 
  46. PANAS .11 .22** .19** .11 .03 -.05 .36** -.08 .86 
 47. Job Performance .12 .21** .12 .18* .39** .34** -.25** .25** .15* .93 
 Note. For sex, 1 = male and 2 = female. For educational level, 1 = less than high school, 2 = high school, 3 = some college but no degree, 4 = 
Associate’s degree, 5 = Bachelor’s degree, 6 = some graduate school but no degree, 7 = Master’s degree, and 8 = Doctoral degree. For English literacy, 
1 = I am a native English speaker, 2 = I learned English as a second language, and 3 = I do not speak fluent English. For reading comprehension, 1 = I 
can read and comprehend complex text such as books or reports that are lengthy or contain technical information, 2= I can read and comprehend 
average-level text such as magazine or newspaper articles, 3= I can read and comprehend simple text such as street signs or application forms, and 4 = I 
cannot read and comprehend written text. NEO: NEO-PI-R, FG: Fake good condition, Honest: Honest condition, Not Revealed: Purpose of test not 
revealed condition, Revealed: Purpose of test revealed condition, CRT: Conditional reasoning test, E: Extraversion, A: Agreeableness, z: Standardized 
variable, GQ: General question, Org: Organizational, PANAS: Positive and negative affect scale. 
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level, two-tailed. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed. Coefficient alphas for each scale 
are presented in the diagonals. Standardized reliabilities are presented for standardized scales.  
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Exploratory results for criterion-related validity.  In order to explore the 
development of the Agreeableness and Extraversion CRT measure further, item-level 
analyses were conducted determine if certain items predicted relevant outcomes better 
than other.  Correlations between each CRT item and the criteria examined in the studies 
were analyzed.  For the Extraversion CRT, it was found that five of the 15 items did not 
correlate with any of the construct-relevant outcomes.  An additional five items 
correlated with either one or two criteria and one item correlated with three relevant 
outcomes.  The other four items were retained in the revised Extraversion CRT 
correlating with at least four relevant outcomes.  After rerunning the correlations, the 
Extraversion CRT was significantly positively related to job performance (r = .20, p 
<.01) and preferring to reach a compromise when making decisions with others (r = .23, 
p <.01).  Extraversion CRT scores were significantly negatively related to the number of 
people they consider a close friend (r = -.18, p <.05), and interpersonal conflict (r = -.29, 
p <.01).  However, after cross validating those results by selecting a new random sample 
from the dataset, all correlations become nonsignificant except preferring to reach a 
compromise when making decisions with others (r = .32, p <.01) which was originally 
developed as an Agreeableness criterion.  It is concluded that these preliminary scale 
refinement techniques did not improve the Extraversion CRT. 
For the Agreeableness CRT, the same revision process was conducted.  Looking 
at the item-level correlations, three of the 18 items correlated with none of the relevant 
outcomes, four correlated with one or two of the relevant outcomes and five correlated 
with three of the outcomes.  The other eight items were retained in the revised 
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Agreeableness CRT.  Results correlating the Agreeableness CRT scores with the 
relevant outcomes result in a significantly positively related to preferring to reach a 
compromise when making decisions with others (r = .19, p <.01).  Agreeableness CRT 
scores were significantly negatively related to the number of organizations the person is 
a part of (r = -.18, p <.05), the level of involvement in these organizations, (r = -.15, p 
<.05), and holding a leadership position (r = -.25, p <.01) or wanting to hold a leadership 
position (r = -.15, p <.05) in these organizations, the PANAS (r = -.17, p <.05), and 
interpersonal conflict (r = -.21, p <.01).  Cross-validation results show a significantly 
positive relationship with preferring to reach a compromise when making decisions with 
others (r = .27, p <.01) and a significantly negative relationship with the number of 
organizations the person is a part of (r = -.29, p <.05), the level of involvement in these 
organizations, (r = -.28, p <.05), and holding a leadership position (r = -.37, p <.01) in 
these organizations as well as the PANAS (r = -.25, p <.05). Although these preliminary 
scale refinement techniques produced many large correlations for selection research, it 
did not greatly improve the criterion-related validity of the measure. 
Incremental validity. Hypothesis 3 postulated that CRTs for Agreeableness and 
Extraversion would have incremental validity in the prediction of construct-relevant 
outcomes over and above traditional tests of these constructs.  In order to test this 
hypothesis, a hierarchical regression was conducted.  Looking over the significant 
correlations from Table 11, it was determined that the criteria of number of close friends, 
number of people calling you a close friend, and interpersonal conflict were the only 
outcome variables that had significant correlations with both types of personality tests.  
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For each regression, the construct-relevant outcome variable was entered as the 
dependent variable, Step 1 contained the construct-relevant NEO measure, and Step 2 
contained the construct-relevant CRT measure.  The results of the regressions are found 
in Table 12.  None of the CRTs provided incremental validity in the prediction of the 
three construct-relevant outcomes over and above the NEO as evidenced by the 
nonsignificant change in R
2
.  Therefore Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Table 12 
Hierarchical Regression Results 
Outcome Variable Step  β R² t F ΔR² ΔF 
# of Close Friends 1 NEO .07 .01 .35 .89   
 2 CRT .02 .01 .81 .47 .00 .06 
# of People Calling 
You a Close 
Friend 
1 NEO .17 .03 2.35 5.54   
 2 CRT -.16 .05 -2.18 5.20 .03 4.75 
Interpersonal 
Conflict 
1 NEO -.49 .24 15.26 57.06   
 2 CRT .02 .24 .22 28.41 .00 .05 
Note. For all regressions, * p<.05. #: Number. Number of Close Friends, Number of People Calling You a 
Close Friend, and Interpersonal Conflict df(step 1) = 1, 185, df(step 2) = 1, 184. 
 
Results for traditional personality tests.  Hypothesis 4 stated that for 
traditional tests, test takers would be able to fake when instructed to do so, leading to 
higher mean differences for those in the “fake good” condition compared to the honest 
responding condition.  In order to test this hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA was 
conducted for NEO test scores under the fake good and honest response conditions.  
Results indicate a significant difference in NEO scores for the honest and fake good 
conditions; F(1, 186) = 48.07, p = .00.  Mean scores for the NEO tests were higher in the 
faking condition compared to the honest condition.  Means, standard deviations, effect 
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sizes, and confidence intervals for all analyses can be found in Table 13.  Effect sizes are 
medium, indicating support for Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5 posited that for traditional tests, there would be a slight increase in 
the ability to fake when the purpose of the test was revealed instead of when it is kept 
hidden.  This hypothesis was tested using a two-way ANOVA with NEO test scores as 
the dependent variable and faking and purpose of the test as the grouping variables.  
Results indicate that there is no significant difference between NEO test scores when the 
true purpose of the test is revealed or when the true purpose of the test is not revealed; 
F(1, 186) = .62, p = .43.  Therefore, there is no support for Hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 6 investigated the impact of construct on faking.  It was argued that 
for traditional personality tests, Extraversion would be more susceptible to faking as 
evidenced by mean score differences than Agreeableness.  A two-way ANOVA was 
conducted to investigate the impact of test construct on faking the NEO personality test.  
Results suggest that there is a significant difference in ability to fake on the 
Agreeableness test (ΔMfake good-honest = .83) compared to the Extraversion test (ΔMfake good-
honest = .44); F(1, 186) = , p = .04, partial η
2
 = .02.  Although there is a significant 
difference in faking on these two tests, the results are opposite of what was 
hypothesized.  These results suggest that test takers are better able to fake the 
Agreeableness rather than Extraversion tests.  It is concluded that there is no support for 
Hypothesis 6.   
Results for conditional reasoning personality tests.  Hypothesis 7 stated that 
test takers would not be able to fake conditional reasoning tests when instructed to do so 
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as evidenced by mean score differences.  In order to test this hypothesis, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted for CRT test scores under the fake good and honest response 
conditions.  Results indicate no significant difference in CRT scores for the honest  and 
fake good conditions; F(1, 186) = 3.39, p = .07.  Therefore, Hypothesis 7 is supported. 
Hypothesis 8 stated that conditional reasoning tests will be less susceptible to 
faking than traditional personality tests as evidenced by standardized mean score 
differences.  This hypothesis was tested using a two-way MANOVA with standardized 
CRT and NEO scores as the dependent variables and faking and type of test as the 
grouping variables.  The multivariate test reveals that faking and test conditions do not 
have a significant effect on standardized test scores.  Results indicate that there is no 
significant difference between standardized test scores when participants are instructed 
to fake good or respond honestly, Wilks’ λ = .97, F (2, 182) = 2.47, p = .09, partial η2 = 
.03.  Given these results and the small effect size, Hypothesis 8 is not supported. 
Hypothesis 9 argued that conditional reasoning tests for Agreeableness and 
Extraversion would only be resistant to faking when the purpose of the test was not 
revealed to participants.  However, if the purpose of the test was revealed to participants, 
mean score differences would be higher when participants are instructed to “fake good” 
than when participants are instructed to respond honestly.  A two-way ANOVA with 
CRT scores as the outcome variable and faking and test purpose revelation as the 
grouping variables was conducted to test this hypothesis.  Results show a nonsignificant 
difference between the fake good and honest conditions when the purpose of the test is 
not revealed (ΔMfake good-honest = .37) compared to when the purpose of the test is revealed 
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(ΔMfake good-honest = 1.2); F(1, 186) =, p = .33, partial η
2
 = .01.  Therefore, there is no 
support for Hypothesis 9.   
Hypothesis 10 asserted that there would be a greater impact of the revelation of 
the purpose of the test on faking for CRTs compared to traditional personality tests.  
Because it is hypothesized that CRTs will only be resistant to faking when the purpose 
of the test is concealed from the test taker, standardized mean score differences for the 
“fake good” and honest responding conditions will be smallest (i.e., least impact of 
faking) for the CRT when the purpose of the test is not revealed.  There will be large 
standardized mean score differences for faking (i.e., greater impact of faking) for the 
traditional personality test when the purpose of the test is not revealed because the 
traditional test is an explicit test.  It is expected that there will be slightly greater 
standardized mean score differences in faking for the traditional personality test when 
the purpose of the test is revealed and that when the purpose of the test is revealed for 
the CRT, standardized mean score differences in faking will be similar to the traditional 
test.  To test this hypothesis, a two-way MANOVA was conducted with standardized 
NEO and CRT scores as the dependent variables and faking and test revelation 
conditions as the grouping variables.  Results indicate that there is no significant 
difference in faking on standard CRTs or traditional personality tests when the purpose 
of the test is revealed or not revealed, Wilks’ λ = .99, F (2, 182) = 1.00, p = .37, partial 
η2 = .01.  Hypothesis 10 is not supported.  
Hypothesis 11 stated that for conditional reasoning tests, the Extraversion 
construct would be more susceptible to faking than the Agreeableness construct as 
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evidenced by mean score differences.  A two-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate 
the impact of test construct on faking the CRTs.  There was no significant difference in 
the ability to fake the Agreeableness CRT (ΔMfake good-honest = .53) compared to the 
Extraversion CRT (ΔMfake good-honest = 1.06); F(1, 186) = .36, p = .55, partial η
2
 = .002.  
Given the small effect size and the nonsignificant results, Hypothesis 11 is not 
supported. 
Hypothesis 12 argued that there will be a greater impact of the type of construct 
(egoistic or moralistic factors) on faking for the traditional personality test than the CRT 
such that standardized mean score differences for the “fake good” and honest responding 
conditions is greatest (i.e., more impact of faking) for the traditional Extraversion test, 
followed by the traditional Agreeableness test, the Extraversion CRT, and the 
Agreeableness CRT.  After scores on the NEO and CRTs were standardized, a two-way 
MANOVA was conducted with standardized CRT and NEO scores as the dependent 
variables and faking and type of construct as the grouping variables.  The multivariate 
test reveals that faking and construct conditions do not have a significant effect on 
standardized test scores, Wilks’ λ = .97, F (2, 182) = 2.84, p = .06, partial η2 = .03.  
Hypothesis 12 is not supported. 
Hypothesis 13 maintained that standardized mean score differences between the 
“fake good” and honest responding conditions will be the least (i.e., little effect of 
faking) for the Agreeableness CRT when the purpose of the test is not revealed.  There 
will be a slightly greater impact of faking (i.e., higher standardized mean score 
differences) for the Extraversion CRT when the purpose of the test is not revealed.  
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However, it is expected that once the purpose of the test is revealed, the CRT will 
function as an explicit test and standardized mean score differences for the “fake good” 
and honest responding conditions will be similar to the traditional tests.  Standardized 
mean score differences between the “fake good” and honest responding conditions for 
the traditional test will be greater for the Agreeableness and Extraversion traditional 
personality tests when the purpose of the test is not revealed than the CRT when the 
purpose of the test is not revealed; however, the Extraversion traditional test will have a 
greater impact of faking than the Agreeableness traditional test.  When the purpose of 
the test is revealed, standardized mean score differences between the “fake good” and 
honest responding conditions for both the traditional tests and CRTs will be greater than 
any of the previous conditions.  CRT and traditional tests of Extraversion will have the 
greatest impact of faking as evidenced by standardized mean score differences, followed 
by tests of Agreeableness.  Standardized mean score differences for these types of tests 
when the purpose of the test is revealed will be similar for CRTs and traditional tests. In 
order to test this hypothesis a three-way MANOVA was conducted with NEO and CRT 
scores as the dependent variables and faking, construct, and revelation conditions as the 
grouping variables.  Results indicate that there is no significant difference in faking on 
standardized CRTs or traditional personality tests when the purpose of the test is 
revealed or not revealed, for either Agreeableness or Extraversion measures, Wilks’ λ = 
.99, F (2, 182) = .96, p = .38, partial η2 = .01.  Therefore, there was no support for 
Hypothesis 13. 
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Table 13 
Study Results  
 
 
   95% Confidence 
Interval 
  
Hypothesis df 
Test 
Statistic p 
Effect 
Size Condition M SD 
Lower 
Bound
 
Upper 
Bound 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
4 (NEO) 1, 186 F = 48.07 .00 η2 = .21 FG 4.25 .64 4.11 4.38 Yes 
     H 3.61 .62 3.48 3.73  
5 (NEO) 1, 186 F = .62 .43 η2 = .00 FG R 4.28 .66 4.09 4.46 No 
     FG NR 4.22 .62 4.03 4.40  
     H R 3.72 .61 3.53 3.90  
     H NR 3.51 .62 3.34 3.69  
6 (NEO) 1, 186 F = 4.45 .04 η2 = .02  E FG 4.18 .66 4.00 4.37 No 
     E H 3.74 .67 3.56 3.91  
     A FG 4.31 .62 4.13 4.49  
     A H 3.48 .54 3.30 3.66  
7 (CRT) 1, 186 F = 3.39 .07 η2 = .02 FG 2.95 3.01 2.34 3.56 Yes 
     H 2.15 2.93 1.55 2.75  
8 (NEO) 2, 182 F = 2.47 .09 η2 = .03 FG .74 a .70 a .48 1.00 No 
     H -.44
 a
 .88
 a
 -.69 -.19  
8 (CRT)     FG .05
 a
 1.05
 a
 -.33 .24  
     H -.15
 a
 1.03
 a
 -.43 .14  
9 (CRT) 1, 186 F = .95  .33 η2 = .01 FG R 3.53 2.87 2.67 4.39 No 
     FG NR 2.36 3.07 1.49 3.22  
     H R 2.33 2.99 1.47 3.19  
     H NR 2.16 2.96 1.17 2.81  
10 (NEO) 2, 182 F = 1.00 .37 η2 = .01 FG R .51 a .94 a .25 .77 No 
     FG NR .42
 a
 .89
 a
 .16 .69  
     H R -.29
 a
 .86
 a
 -.55 -.03  
     H NR -.58
 a
 .88
 a
 -.83 -.33  
(table continues)  
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Table 13 Continued 
 
 
   95% Confidence 
Interval 
  
Hypothesis df 
Test 
Statistic p 
Effect 
Size Condition M SD 
Lower 
Bound
 
Upper 
Bound 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
10 (CRT)     FG R .33
 a
 .96
 a
 .05 .62  
     FG NR -.06
 a
 1.03
 a
 -.35 .23  
     H R -.07
 a
 1.00
 a
 -.36 .22  
     H NR -.18
 a
 .97
 a
 -.46 .09  
11 (CRT) 1, 186 F = .36 .55 η2 = .00 E FG 3.08 3.37 2.21 3.94 No 
     E H 2.02 2.80 1.18 2.86  
     A FG 2.82 2.62 1.95 3.70  
     A H 2.29 3.07 1.43 3.15  
12 (NEO) 2, 182 F = 2.84 .06 η2 = .03 E FG .38 .94 .12 .63 No 
     E H -.26 .95 -.51 -.01  
     A FG .56 .88 .30 .82  
     A H -.63 .76 -.88 -.37  
12 (CRT)     E FG .18 1.13 -.11 .47  
     E H -.17 .94 -.46 .11  
     A FG .09 .88 -.20 .39  
     A H .08 1.02 -.37 .20  
13 (NEO) 2, 178 F = .99 .38 η2 = .01 FG R E .38 .99 .02 .75 No 
     FG NR E .37 .91 .01 .74  
     FG R A .63 .90 .27 1.00  
     FG NR A .48 .88 .10 .85  
     H R E -.14 1.00 -.51 .22  
     H NR E -.37 .90 -.71 -.02  
     H R A -.44 .68 -.80 -.07  
     H NR A -.81 .80 -1.17 -.45  
(table continues) 
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Table 13 Continued 
 
 
   95% Confidence 
Interval 
  
Hypothesis df 
Test 
Statistic p 
Effect 
Size Condition M SD 
Lower 
Bound
 
Upper 
Bound 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
13 (CRT)     FG R E .31 1.07 -.10 .72  
     FG NR E .05 1.20 -.36 .46  
     FG R A .36 .86 -.05 .77  
     FG NR A -.18 .82 -.60 .24  
     H R E .02 1.00 -.39 .42  
     H NR E -.34 .86 -.73 .04  
     H R A -.16 1.01 -.57 .25  
     H NR A -.01 1.06 -.41 .39  
Note. FG = Fake good condition, H = Honest condition, NR = Purpose of test not revealed condition, R = Purpose of test revealed condition, NEO = 
NEO-PI-R, CRT = Conditional reasoning test, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness. 
a 
Represents standardized values.
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSIONS 
Overview  
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of faking on traditional, 
self-report personality tests (such as the NEO-PI-R) and a new test for personality, the 
conditional reasoning test (CRT).  CRTs have been argued to be superior to other 
personality tests because they operate at a subconscious level and are therefore difficult 
to fake (James, 1998, LeBreton et al., 2007).  CRTs have also been reported to be just as 
valid, or more valid, in predicting relevant outcomes (Berry et al., 2010; James et al., 
2005).  However, previous studies have primarily focused on measuring the construct of 
Aggression.  The current study departs from this trend by exploring the utility of the 
conditional reasoning method of assessment for two often studied constructs in the I/O 
psychology literature: Extraversion and Agreeableness.  These CRTs and corresponding 
traditional personality measures were administered under a variety of conditions (faking 
instructions, revelation of the true purpose of the test) to determine whether CRTs were 
useful in the prediction of several construct-relevant criteria and whether CRTs could be 
faked.  Results show that the CRTs for Agreeableness and Extraversion are related to 
construct-related criteria.  However, the NEO tests are more valid in the prediction of 
these criteria.  In terms of faking, participants were not able to fake the CRT if the 
purpose of the test at a personality measure remained hidden.  When the true nature of 
the test was revealed, participants were still unable to fake the Agreeableness or 
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Extraversion CRT.  This lends support to the notion that the justification mechanisms 
people endorse occur at the level of the subconscious.   
Criterion-Related Validity of the CRT and NEO-PI-R 
The criterion-related validity of the CRTs was compared to the criterion-related 
validity of the NEO-PI-R to determine the utility of the CRTs.  Because CRTs are much 
more onerous to develop than traditional self-report personality tests, it is important to 
make sure that CRTs do, in fact, measure what they purport to measure and they do so 
comparably to traditional tests.  For Hypotheses 1 and 2, it was found that both the NEO 
and the CRT correlated with relevant outcomes.  However, the NEO tests were 
significantly related to more positive outcomes (and in some instances correlations had a 
greater magnitude with criteria) than the CRT and the CRT failed to provide incremental 
validity above and beyond the CRT for construct-related criteria (Hypothesis 3).  These 
results show that the CRT-E and CRT-A do not predict relevant outcomes as well as the 
NEO-PI-R tests.   
Although these results are not encouraging for the usefulness of CRTs for 
Agreeableness and Extraversion, it should be noted that these tests have not been 
subjected to the same development and research as the Aggression CRT.  Berry 
(personal communication, November, 2012) stated that, although not widely known, the 
Aggression CRT initially contained hundreds of items and only a very low percentage of 
items were found to correlate well with relevant outcomes.  Therefore, future research 
into the applicability of the conditional reasoning method for other personality tests 
should aim to generate a large item pool so that traditional test development techniques 
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can reveal a more valid test.  Many personality tests are developed in exactly this 
manner.  Indeed, the items that were the basis for the International Personality Item Pool 
NEO (IPIP-NEO) originally began as 1,311 Dutch items that were reduced to 914 
(Hofstee, Kiers, De Raad, Goldberg, & Ostendorf, 1997).  Similarly, the 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) initially contained 1, 082 items but 
was reduced to 276 items through test refinement (Tellegen & Waller, 2008). 
Although scale refinement was not a main aim of the current paper, it would be 
interesting to see how the most predictive ten items from the current CRTs for 
Agreeableness and Extraversion would compare against the Agreeableness and 
Extraversion NEO-PI-R.  The NEO-PI-R has undergone many changes since its 
inception. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to analyze the criterion-related 
validity of the best possible version of the CRTs to the NEO.  Although some 
preliminary analyses were conducted without much change in criterion-related validity, a 
more rigorous item refinement process may result in an equally valid measure of these 
traits.  Future research in this line of research will include these next steps. 
It is also important to note that some of the CRT items were answered in an 
illogical manner, despite the fact that the illogical items should in fact be irrational given 
the item stem. The CRT items were examined by several industrial and organizational 
graduate students and faculty to help ensure clarity as well as illogical answers.  Further, 
illogical responding occurred for both CRTs and under both fake good or honest 
responding sets.  It is unclear why participants in this study chose illogical responses 
more frequently than other CRTs.  As discussed in the limitations section of this paper, 
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perhaps participant motivation to read and fully comprehend the CRT items was 
diminished because of the online administration of the test. Further, it might be that even 
though these options were illogical to the highly educated item reviewers, this was less 
obvious to the members of the sample whose educational level, on average, was lower 
than the item reviewers.  
Faking on Traditional and Conditional Reasoning Tests of Personality 
One of the proposed advantages of CRTs over traditional tests is that CRTs are 
less susceptible to faking (i.e., “faking good” to increase likelihood of selection) than are 
traditional tests. This was tested by asking respondents to complete both a traditional, 
self-report measure of Agreeableness and Extraversion and a CRT for Agreeableness 
and Extraversion. Half of the participants were instructed to respond to the measures 
honestly while half of the participants were instructed to fake good on the measures.  
This methodology allowed the researcher to determine the fakeability of CRTs compared 
to traditional personality tests.  
Hypothesis 4 investigated the ability of test takers to fake the NEO tests when 
instructed to do so.  Consistent with previous research (Hough et al., 1990; Viswesvaran 
& Ones, 1999), Hypothesis 4 was supported, indicating that test takers can fake 
traditional tests when instructed to do so.  This significant finding gives credibility to the 
validity of the experimental manipulation, even though the manipulation check did not 
necessarily indicate that the manipulation was successful.  As mentioned in the Results 
section, placement and wording of the manipulation check likely led to participant 
confusion about what the question was truly asking.  The results for Hypothesis 4 
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emphasize the negative impact faking can have on personality tests and reiterates the 
need for strategies to reduce faking. 
In parallel, Hypothesis 7 proposed that test takers who were instructed to fake 
good on the CRTs would not be able to do so.  No significant differences between fake 
good and honest conditions for the CRTs were found indicating that test takers were 
unable to fake the CRTs.  This is consistent with past research (LeBreton et al., 2007) 
which found that CRTs are resistant to faking if the true purpose of the test is kept 
hidden. This result is encouraging because the major benefit of CRTs compared to other 
methods of measurement is that CRTs are implicit and impervious to faking.  
However, conditional reasoning tests were not found to be significantly less 
susceptible to faking than traditional personality tests as evidenced by standardized mean 
score differences (Hypothesis 8).  This finding greatly reduces the attractiveness of 
CRTs compared to traditional personality tests.  The development and administration of 
CRTs are onerous compared to traditional personality tests.  The excitement surrounding 
the use of CRTs as a predictor of employment outcomes is mainly driven by the 
possibility that CRTs can circumvent the faking issue.  Without evidence of the ability of 
CRTs to reduce faking, it is difficult to recommend CRTs as a practical replacement for 
traditional personality tests.  Given past studies on other CRTs, it is interesting that there 
was not a significant difference in faking between the two types of tests, although the 
current author is unaware of any research that directly tests this comparison.  It may be 
that response options to the CRT were not equally socially desirable.  When the items 
were reviewed by faculty members and graduate students, the social desirability of the 
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response options was not directly assessed.  Future CRT development should ensure that 
this important component of test development is not overlooked. 
Faking when the Nature of the Test is Revealed 
Another proposed advantage of CRTs over traditional tests is that the implicit 
nature of the test also makes the true nature of the test covert. This lack of transparency 
again makes it more difficult to fake relative to traditional tests, so people cannot 
intentionally inflate scores. This was tested by informing half of the participants from 
the honest and fake good conditions of the true nature of the test (i.e., that the tests 
measure personality) while the other half had the true purpose of the test kept hidden.  
This research design allowed the researcher to determine whether a reduction in 
fakeability for CRTs was due to the implicit nature of the test or whether it is due to 
mere test taker deception about what the test measures.  
First, revealing the nature of the NEO personality measure had no effect on test 
scores. Although this finding is not consistent with Hypothesis 5, it is not surprising.  
Test takers have likely been exposed to personality tests that are similar in structure to 
the NEO-PI-R.  Even if test takers were not familiar with such a test, the phrases that are 
rated as part of the NEO-PI-R are likely to be seen as related to one’s personality.  
Therefore, it is likely that any changes in the difference between the purpose of the test 
conditions would be due only for the CRT and not enough to drive significant results.   
According to Hypothesis 9, conditional reasoning tests for Agreeableness and 
Extraversion should only be resistant to faking when the purpose of the test is not 
revealed to participants.  Support was not found for this hypothesis.  These results 
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suggest that there were no differences in mean scores regardless of whether or not the 
purpose of the test is revealed and test takers are not able to fake to a greater extent when 
they are told the true nature of the test.  Therefore the reduction in the ability to fake on 
CRTs is not merely driven by the fact that items appear to be logical reasoning 
problems, but are impervious to faking because test takers rely on the justification 
mechanisms underlying the test items.  In regards to Hypothesis 10, there was not a 
greater impact of the revelation of the purpose of the test on faking for CRTs compared 
to traditional personality tests.   
Faking on Tests of Different Constructs 
However, Hypothesis 6, traditional Extraversion tests would be easier to fake 
than Agreeableness tests, was not supported.  Contrary to the hypothesis, traditional 
Agreeableness tests were more susceptible to faking than Extraversion tests.  Other 
studies have found similar results for the high fakeability of Agreeableness, particularly 
in older samples, as is the case in the current study (Donnellan & Lucas, 2008; Furnham, 
1997; McCrae et al., 1999; Mount, Barrick, & Strauss, 1994).  Also, the response 
instructions given to participants may have inadvertently influenced the fakeability of 
the Agreeableness test compared to the Extraversion test because the NEO test items 
were more similar to the adjectives used to describe the trait in the response instructions 
for the Agreeableness test than the Extraversion test.  This similarity might allow test 
takers to more easily identify the test items that need to be faked.   
Hypothesis 11 stated that the Extraversion CRT would have greater mean test 
scores than the Agreeableness CRT.  No significant differences were found for the 
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conditional reasoning tests, however.  This result is somewhat surprising given the 
significant result for differences in faking on the traditional personality test.  Given the 
small effect size for the effect of construct on traditional personality tests, it may be that 
the implicit nature of the CRT overrides any effect attributed to the construct.  If people 
are unconsciously selecting a response option based on their personality, and by doing so 
making the faking issue irrelevant, it may mean that any differences derived from either 
the egoistic or moralistic construct would be exceeded by the fact that self-deception and 
impression management do not play a role in the CRT.  Similarly, Hypothesis 12 found 
no differences in faking based on construct (Agreeableness and Extraversion) such that 
the differences due to construct had a greater impact for the traditional test compared to 
the CRT.  Given that there were no significant findings for the effect of construct on 
CRT, it is not surprising that the effect is not larger for CRTs than traditional personality 
tests.    
Faking Related to both Test Purpose Revelation and Construct 
Hypothesis 13 was related to the interaction effect of construct and revelation of 
the purpose of the test on the faking of traditional and conditional reasoning personality 
tests.  No significant differences were found for these interactions.  Given the fact that 
there were no significant effects for the purpose and the construct, as noted above, this 
result is not surprising. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are several limitations to this study.  As mentioned previously, the number 
of CRT items for the Extraversion (15 items) and the Agreeableness (18 items) was 
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likely too few to provide a large enough item pool from which to pull valid items.  
Future research would benefit greatly from a personality test for the Big Five traits that 
is based on conditional reasoning.  In order to generate a useful test, a large scale test 
development process is needed.  This process includes generating a large number of 
items, collecting data and examining inter-item correlations, reliabilities, factor structure, 
and criterion-related, construct, and content-related validity data.  Then, items of poor 
quality could be deleted from the scales, new items written, and further data collected.  
Should future CRTs for factors of the Big Five be developed, it would also be useful to 
generate multiple items for each of the justification mechanisms in order to make sure 
that the content domain is being adequately captured.  The difficulty in obtaining this 
type of data for conditional reasoning test items is the length of time that it takes 
participants to read and respond to these items.  Test taker fatigue is an issue in 
collecting this data so careful consideration should be given to the number of items 
participants are given in any one test session.  In order to create a high-caliber CRT, 
multiple iterations of data collection and analysis is needed, likely taking many years to 
complete. 
Similarly, a potential limitation of this study is participant motivation.  The 
Aggression CRT was developed and refined using student data that was obtained in a 
paper-and-pencil format (James, 1998).  While previous studies have shown that online 
participant recruiting sites collect equally valid data compared to traditional ways of 
collecting data (Barger, & Sinar, 2011; Behrend et al., 2011; Buhrmester et al., 2011; 
Paolacci et al., 2010), it is unknown how high reading load affects test taker motivation 
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when items are presented in paper-and-pencil format compared to a computer-based 
method. Participants were reimbursed for their time at a rate above minimum wage.  The 
median amount of time taken to complete the study was 46 minutes, making the pay rate 
approximately 13 dollars per hour.  After examining several studies that are published on 
StudyResponse, it appears that studies run approximately 10-20 minutes in length 
(Burnfield & Rogelberg, 2003; Van Ryzin, 2003).  However, this rate of pay may not 
have seemed adequate for the perceived amount of tediousness involved in answering 
the items.  Even though participants were informed that the study would likely take an 
hour to complete, this sample might not be used to partaking in studies this long, leading 
to fatigue and decreased motivation.  The format of the CRT items may also have been 
perceived as cumbersome compared to other surveys in which they have participated 
which typically ask short questions that require little effort to read and understand.  
Lastly, due to the relative anonymity of using a computer and/or lack of engagement in 
the study, participants may have believed that there would be relatively little risk in 
determining whether or not their responses were legitimate and not random.  Participants 
were warned in the information sheets that they would not be compensated if it was 
found that they responded randomly; however, this threat may have been disregarded.  It 
would have been more helpful to include items about participants’ motivation to engage 
in the study and specific information related to their attitudes toward the CRTs.  The 
relatively high rate of endorsement of illogical responding may be evidence of lack of 
test taker motivation and random responding.   
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The current study utilized the “fake good” paradigm often seen in the faking 
literature (Hough et al., 1990; LeBreton et al., 2007).  However, future research would 
benefit from measuring social desirability directly.  As mentioned previously in the 
paper, faking can be operationalized as social desirability or impression management 
(Ones et al., 1996; Paulhus, 2002).  Including a social desirability scale in the next 
administration of the CRTs would provide an alternative way to test whether or not test 
takers can fake the CRT.  Measuring social desirability would also allow for the 
investigation of the impact of corrections for faking on CRTs, an avenue of research that 
has not been explored. 
It would also be interesting to investigate the impact of different scoring 
algorithms on the validity and fakeability of CRTs.  Currently, CRTs are scored such 
that each item is worth -1, 0 or +1.  Each item score is then summed to arrive at the final 
scale score; higher positive scores theoretically indicate that the test taker possesses 
more of the intended construct and larger negative scores theoretically indicate that the 
test taker possesses more of the trait on the opposite of the intended construct. It is 
unclear what exactly a score of zero across all items means, however. A score of zero 
may mean that the test taker chose all illogical options or that they score midway 
between opposite poles of the construct of interest.  The current scoring methodology 
conceptualizes the construct of interest in a dichotomous way, but different scoring 
methodologies could use justification mechanisms to place the test taker on a continuum.  
Similar to the outcomes of research on biodata and situational judgment tests (SJTs), 
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different scoring methodologies may impact the validity of CRTs (Bergman et al., 2006).  
Therefore, future research should examine the impact of differences in scoring. 
Another limitation of this study is that the reliabilities for each of the CRTs were 
low even compared to reported alphas from other studies.  The range of alphas for the 
CRTs was -.04 to .30.  As mentioned previously, CRTs, as evidenced by Cronbach’s 
alpha, are typically low and it is likely that other types of reliability are more appropriate 
(James, 1998; Le Breton et al., 2007).  Published alphas for the Aggression CRT have 
been above the .70 cutoff typically used during the test development stage (LeBreton et 
al., 2007).  This might have contributed to lack of support for the hypotheses.   
Conclusions 
 This study adds to the understanding of CRTs in a variety of ways.  First, this 
study examined whether the methodology of conditional reasoning that had only been 
previously used for measures of Aggression and Achievement Motivation could be 
applied to other personality traits such as Agreeableness and Extraversion.  This study 
also tested the claim that CRTs are resistant to faking (as long as the purpose of the test 
is obscured).  The findings from this study indicate that traditional, self-report 
personality tests are more valid at predicting relevant outcomes and that there are no 
differences between CRTs or traditional tests for Agreeableness and Extraversion when 
it comes to participant faking.  Although the conditional reasoning format provides a 
new and exciting method of assessment, based on these results its utility as a practical 
predictor likely should be tempered due to the amount of resources required to develop 
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and administer such tests.  At least for the CRT-A and the CRT-E, the meager ends do 
not justify the means. 
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